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Recent innovations in mobile wireless technology have instigated a debate between two camps of legal scholars about federal administration
of the electromagnetic spectrum. The first camp argues that the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) should define spectrum
use rights more clearly and give spectrum licensees broad property
rights in frequencies. The second camp argues that, rather than award
exclusive licenses to the highest bidder, the FCC ought to open much, if
not most, of the spectrum to unlicensed use by smartphones and tablets
equipped with the newest spectrum administration technology.
First, this Article shows that both of these camps comprise a new orthodoxy that eschews conventions in public lawmaking in federal spectrum administration and instead prefers an approach that is sealed
away from direct public scrutiny. This new orthodoxy assumes that
supply and demand in the market for emergent smart spectrum sharing
technologies is a more objective administrator of the public interest
than the public lawmaking processes even can be.
Second, this Article challenges the new orthodoxy by arguing that local
public participation in federal spectrum administration can align the
new technologies with the diverse priorities of each community in ways
that neither the technologies alone, nor the markets for them, ever can.
It is of no legal or normative consequence, this Article asserts, that
substantive federal spectrum policy encourages commercial adoption
of the newest technology. Rather, this Article argues, lawmakers in this
field ought to create procedural mechanisms in federal spectrum administration that accommodate local communities’ diverging interests.
Local participation in the formulation of spectrum policy gives a purpose to communication technologies that are otherwise morally ambiguous. In the end, the Article proposes a solution on the basis of
relatively recent legal scholarship and developments in public law
administration.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Recent innovations in mobile wireless transmission technology over the
past two decades have radically transformed the thinking among legal scholars and policymakers about the structure of telecommunications policymaking.1 The new orthodoxy at the Federal Communications Commission and
in legal scholarship overlooks systematic local community participation in
federal spectrum administration for a more sealed off, technologically dependent approach. It assumes that emergent spectrum sharing technology in
today’s smartphones and tablets can achieve the “public interest” more objectively than conventional public lawmaking processes.2
This Article argues that this recent trend offends long-standing administrative law norms and procedural conventions in telecommunications policymaking that explicitly incorporate public participation as a matter of
course. Federal spectrum administration has been drifting away from local
public participation for at least two decades, but it has existed for much
longer. In the 1927 Radio Act, Congress affirmatively chose a rationalized
structure for spectrum administration over the then prevailing laissez faire
1.
Devices equipped with “spectrum sharing” and “spread spectrum” technologies are
more efficient than older transmission systems because they make more of the electromagnetic
spectrum available. See infra Part I.A.
2.
This article throughout refers to the “public interest” as a statutory term of art in the
1934 Communications Act. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2012).
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approach. The first reformers did this in part to redress what they perceived
to be frequency scarcity and interference. But, as Part II.A shows, they also
sought to do much more than implement a regulatory fix for a perceived
technological problem. The comparative hearings that Congress established
under the 1927 Radio Act, this Article argues, were intended to involve local
community groups and stakeholders in order to moderate the impact that
radio programming might have on local community life. In this formative
era, policymakers recognized that new wireless technology would only be as
integrated into public life as policymakers and local stakeholders allowed.
They recognized that broadcasting technology by itself was unsympathetic
to the real life contingencies in diverse local communities across the country. This approach survived, if unevenly, for most of the twentieth century.
Amid the ideological wave of deregulation of the 1980s and 90s, Congress reformed federal spectrum administration to do away with subjective
local community participation. The prior system of awarding licenses pursuant to public comparative hearings had grown notoriously inefficient and
unresponsive to innovations in telecommunications. Accordingly, in 1993,
Congress substituted the cold objective logic of the market for local public
participation.
Today, emergent smart spectrum sharing technologies are instigating yet
another transformation. In short, the new technologies make the spectrum far
more available and flexible than policymakers in the 1920s, or even 1990s,
ever imagined. These innovations have occasioned a debate among scholars
about how policymakers should further liberalize federal spectrum administration. One camp argues that the FCC should define auctioned spectrum use
rights more clearly and give auction winners broad property rights.3 Others
argue that, rather than award exclusive licenses to the highest bidder, the
FCC ought to open much of the spectrum to unlicensed use by smartphones
and tablets equipped with the newest spectrum administration technology.4
Both approaches—spectrum-as-property and unlicensed use—are finding
3.

See, e.g., WILLIAM BAUMOL & DOROTHY ROBYN, TOWARD AN EVOLUTIONARY RESPECTRUM GOVERNANCE: LICENSING OR UNRESTRICTED ENTRY? (2006); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private and Public Control, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 2007 (2003); Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited
Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big
Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2001); Thomas
W. Hazlett & Evan T. Leo, The Case for Liberal Spectrum Licenses: A Technical and Economic Perspective, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037 (2011); Glen O. Robinson, Spectrum Property Law 101, 41 J.L. & ECON. 609, 619–20 (1998).
4.
See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Open Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from
Market Adoption, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69 (2012); Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
287 (1998); Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2 (2002); Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269 (2004); Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory
of Wireless Communication, 82 TEX. L. REV. 863 (2004).
GIME FOR

124

Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review

[Vol. 20:121

their way to federal spectrum administration today to create something of a
mixed approach in federal policy; some spectrum bands are auctioned off to
the highest bidder, while others are reserved for unlicensed use, as in Wi-Fi
bands and “white spaces” between licensed bands for over-the-air
broadcasting.5
Both approaches place greater weight on the sophistication of the new
spectrum sharing technologies, rather than the articulated priorities of affected local communities. In contrast to both these perspectives, however,
this Article proposes a third approach or, rather, an important qualification to
the new orthodoxy. It argues that the excision of local stakeholders under
both the spectrum-as-property and unlicensed use approaches is deeply
troubling. The central argument is that, even in areas as complex as spectrum administration, local public participation legitimizes policymaking in
ways that uncritical reliance on technological innovation never can. It is of
no legal consequence that federal spectrum administration policy accommodates the newest technology. Now that smart spectrum sharing technologies
are with us, policymakers should ensure that there is an organic fit between
the technologies on the one hand and the affected communities on the other.
They accordingly should implement some mechanism for explicit local participation in administrative decision-making about spectrum use.
Policymakers need not dismantle the auction process altogether. This
Article proposes a solution on the basis of relatively recent administrative
law scholarship and developments in public law administration of communication network infrastructure.6 Examples in federal broadband network administration demonstrate that municipal governments can modify federal
policy in ways that are adapted to local contingencies.
This Article has three parts. Part I outlines the workings of the new
smart spectrum sharing technologies and the manner in which scholars and
policymakers have proposed to incorporate them in current policy. Part II
puts this emergent approach in historical perspective. It describes the reasons
that policymakers almost nine decades ago established a centralized, com5.
See Amendment of the Comm’n’s Rules to Provide for Operation of Unlicensed Nii
Devices in the 5 Ghz Frequency Range, 12 FCC Rcd. 1576 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 U-NII
Order]; Expanding the Econ. & Innovation Opportunities of Spectrum Through Incentive Auctions, 27 FCC Rcd. 12357 (2012) [hereinafter Incentive Auctions NPRM]; Revision of Part 15
of the Comm’n’s Rules to Permit Unlicensed Nat’l Info. Infrastructure (U-Nii) Devices in the
5 Ghz Band, 28 FCC Rcd. 1769 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 U-NII NPRM]; Unlicensed Operation in the TV Broad. Bands, 25 FCC Rcd. 18661 (2010) [hereinafter White Spaces Order]; see
also FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, CONSUMER GUIDE: GETTING BROADBAND (2013), http://transition.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/highspeedinternet.pdf (defining “Wi-Fi” or “wireless fidelity”
as “a short range technology that is often used in conjunction with a customer’s DSL or cable
modem service to connect end-user devices, such as PCs, laptops and smartphones, located
within the customer’s home or business to the Internet.”).
6.
See Olivier Sylvain, Broadband Localism, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 795 (2012) (showing
that the federal government has carved out a positive role for local governments in an array of
legislative fields, including telecommunications and cable, the forbearers of broadband).
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mand-and-control, licensure regime to administer spectrum. Part II also reviews the relatively recent history of competitive bidding in federal
spectrum assignment, the regulatory arrangement on which current proposals
for reform now rest. Part III makes an affirmative argument for the inclusion
of local public participation in federal spectrum administration by relying on
current practices in broadband network infrastructure management and other
federal-local regulatory regimes. Municipal governments in particular are
promising legitimated forums for local public lawmaking. In the end, this
Article argues that local public participation ought to remain in federal spectrum administration for all time—well after the smartphones of today give
way to the next best thing.7
I. THE PROMISE

OF

SMART SPECTRUM TECHNOLOGY

A. Smart Spectrum Sharing Technology
Wireless broadband transmission technologies have created opportunities for users to communicate and share more information with more people
than ever before. The market for wireless applications and services has
grown exponentially in the past five years.8 Mobile data traffic will increase
anywhere from 10 to 25 fold in the next five years.9 The number of wireless
subscribers is already 50 percent greater than the number of wired customers.10 By the end of 2013, mobile device connections on our planet will
outnumber people.11
Emergent wireless transmission and administration technologies will allow consumers and businesses to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum
through which wireless devices transmit and receive voice and data commu7.
See, e.g., Anthony Wing Kosner, Confirmed: Google Glass Will Tether with Android and iPhone for 3G and 4G Data, FORBES (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
anthonykosner/2013/02/23/confirmed-google-glass-will-tether-with-android-and-iphone-for-3
g-or-4g-data/; David Zax, Why Your Car Now Is a Giant Smartphone on Wheels, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fastcompany.com/3007085/innovation-agents/why-your-car
-now-giant-smartphonewheels?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=
Feed%3A+fastcompany%2Fheadlines+%28Fast+Company%29.
8.
See Claire Cain Miller, Mobile Apps Drive Rapid Change in Searches, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 7, 2013, at B1.
9.
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., MACHINE-TO-MACHINE COMMUNICATIONS:
CONNECTING BILLIONS OF DEVICES (2012), available at dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k9gsh2gp043-en;
see also David Talbot, The Spectrum Crunch that Wasn’t, MIT TECH. REV., Nov. 26, 2012,
available at http://www.technologyreview.com/news/507486/the-spectrum-crunch-that-neverreally-was/.
10.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30,
2012 1 (2013).
11.
Craig Timberg, Mobile Device Connections Growing Quickly, WASH. POST (Feb.
25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/mobile-device-connectionsgrowing-quickly/2013/02/25/ca98ea98-7f51-11e2-a350-49866afab584_story.html?wprss=rss_
technology.
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nications.12 Consider, for example, “spectrum sensing” technology that
transmits signals over unused frequencies in the local environment as they
become available.13 Devices equipped with this technology can opportunistically transmit over those available unused frequencies, effectively making
more of the spectrum available than older wireless transmission technologies. Although not without limitations,14 “spectrum sensing” technology
avoids interference by design. Devices equipped with spectrum sensing capability operate on the assumption that spectrum is infinitely renewable and
immediately available, whenever someone else is not actively using that
spectrum.15
Moreover, consider “spread spectrum” technology that can transmit and
receive a single communications over a distributed range of frequencies.
Communications through conventional wireless transmission technology
sends and receives signals on one stable frequency. Spread spectrum systems, to contrast, “hop” the digital signal between a variety of frequencies,
making it harder to eavesdrop, jam, or interfere with the signal. To put it
slightly differently, they disperse the power density of the transmitted signals across a wide range of frequencies and, by doing so, lowers the chances
of interference with other signals sent at those same frequencies.16
Before the emergence of these technologies, prior to the mid-1990s, regulators faced the significant challenge that spectrum frequencies were too
scarce to accommodate all comers — that only one broadcaster based in a
metropolitan area or town could air its signal over a discrete spectrum band
at any given time. As the Article explains in more detail in Part II below,
Congress created the Federal Communications Commission and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, to administer spectrum use under
this “scarcity” constraint.17 Pursuant to the regulatory regime, the FCC (and
12.
Policymakers really have two different kinds of sharing proposals from which to
consider. The first would open to the public spectrum that is currently assigned exclusively to
federal agencies. Under this approach, individuals and companies in designated locations
would gain unrestricted access to certain frequencies at certain times of the day. Many federal
agencies, including the Department of Defense, by far the largest holder of exclusive spectrum
use rights, are supportive of such sharing approaches. Marguerite Reardon, Defense Department Pushes Spectrum Sharing as Solution to Wireless Crunch, CNET (Oct. 10, 2012, 11:30
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57529959-94/defense-department-pushes-spectrumsharing-as-solution-to-wireless-crunch/. The second set of solutions for the looming spectrum
shortage is far more prominent and is the subject of this article.
13.
See 2013 U-NII NPRM, supra note 5.
14.
See Charles Jackson et al., Spread Spectrum Is Good – But It Does Not Obsolete
NBC v. U.S.!, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 245 (2006).
15.
See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: REALIZING THE FULL POTENTIAL OF GOVERNMENT-HELD SPECTRUM TO SPUR ECONOMIC
GROWTH 16 (July 2012) [hereinafter PCAST REPORT].
16.
FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, REPORT OF THE UNRESTRICTED DEVICES AND EXPERIMENTAL LICENSES WORKING GROUP 8 n.13 (Nov. 15, 2002).
17.
See infra Part II.A.
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the FRC before it) played a central role for most of the twentieth century in
awarding exclusive licenses to applicants. The Article refers to this throughout as the command-and-control exclusive licensing regime.18
These spectrum sharing technologies have upended the political economy and regulation of the wireless industry. On the other hand, smart spectrum sharing technologies greatly minimize the problem of scarcity. As
such, they are game changers. Add to this the innovations of the past two
decades in broadband transmission technology, and it was really just a matter of time before the mass media command-and-control licensure regime of
the twentieth century would give way to a new regulatory framework. The
FCC has adapted spectrum administration policy to accommodate the new
sharing technologies and the smartphones, tablets, and mobile applications
that rely on them.19 Recent developments in such areas as wireless health
monitoring, inventory management, and smartgrid administration have
raised the stakes all the more.20
Of course, as technologies for digital data storage, wireless broadband
transmission, and integrated circuitry continue to improve apace,21 the
smartphones and tablets of today, too, will become old news. The rapidly
increasing demand for mobile wireless communications services, devices,
and applications has given new urgency to reform of spectrum administration policy. A memorandum from the office of President Barack Obama
declared in June 2010 that “the wireless broadband revolution” was “the
next transformation in information technology.”22 In order to facilitate the
transition, the memorandum in no uncertain terms directed the Commerce
Department, through the National Information and Technology Administration, to collaborate with the FCC “to make available a total of 500 MHz” of
18.
Pursuant to its authority under the Communications Act, the FCC convened public
hearings to determine whether any given applicant should be awarded an exclusive license to
broadcast over the airwaves in a town, county, or city. In each case, the agency would base its
licensing decision on its staff’s own findings, as well as evidence received from local civic
leaders, businesses, educators, and individuals about whether the applicant would be a better
steward of the public airwaves in the local affected communities than any other potential
broadcaster. Congress in the 1920s and 30s concluded that the comparative hearing process
was the most effective way of regulating spectrum assignment and use. Economists and historians have since convincingly shown that the licensing process was rife with self-dealing and
inefficiency. I return to this in Part II below.
19.
See infra Part II.C.
20.
See Benkler, Open Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market Adoption, supra note 4, at 117-18.
21.
Intel cofounder Gordon Moore famously observed almost fifty years ago that the
number of transistors on integrated circuits doubles about every two years. Gordon Moore,
Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits, ELECTRONICS, April 19, 1965. This
notion has come to be known today as Moore’s Law.
22.
Memorandum from President Barack Obama: Unleashing the Wireless Broadband
Revolution (June 28, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-unleashing-wireless-broadband-revolution.
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spectrum by 2020 for a variety of wireless broadband uses.23 This statement
echoed the high-profile recommendations from the FCC in 2009, which also
recommended making available spectrum bands for unlicensed use “expeditiously.”24 And, just last year, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) concluded that smart spectrum sharing
technologies would help to redress the looming “spectrum shortage.”25 It
proposed that, with the ascendance of spectrum sharing devices in particular,
spectrum bands currently assigned to government uses should be shared with
mass-market uses.26
Policymakers have heeded the call. The FCC recently authorized unlicensed use by smart spectrum sharing devices in the unused “guard channels” that exist between broadcast television channels.27 The agency
approved devices that can operate in these “white spaces.”28 The agency also
is considering unleashing frequencies reserved exclusively today for federal
agencies to unlicensed use by the public.29 For example, the FCC recently
granted to T-Mobile the temporary authority to explore whether commercial
mobile broadband services could feasibly share spectrum in certain limited
geographic locations with government agencies like the Department of
Defense.30
Moreover, pursuant to the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation
Act of 2012, the FCC has initiated at least two important rulemakings that
will make smart spectrum sharing devices more widespread. The first concerns the design of the administrative process for voluntary incentive auctions that would allow over-the-air broadcasters to relinquish their
23.
Id. § 1(a); see also id. § 4 (suggesting strongly that the FCC, an independent
agency, collaborate with the NTIA).
24.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN: CONNECTING
AMERICA 94-95 (2010), http://www.broadband.gov/plan/.
25.
See PCAST REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
26.
Id.
27.
See White Spaces Order, supra note 5.
28.
See, e.g., Letter from Julius P. Knapp Chief of the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n’s Office of Eng’g and Tech., to John Malyar, Chief Architect Interconnection Solutions at
Telcordia Techs. (Mar. 26, 2012), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-12465A1.pdf. This development also underscores the idea that the term “unlicensed” or “unrestricted use” in this area is a misnomer. A user may use unrestricted frequencies as long as
the FCC has certified that their device conforms with the FCC’s Part 15 rules governing harmful interference. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.701-707 (2013).
29.
See, e.g., U-NII NPRM, supra note 5; see also Letter from Lawrence Strickling,
Assistant Sec’y for Commc’ns & Info., to FCC Chairman Genachowski (Feb. 19, 2013), http://
0-op.bna.com.lawpac.lawnet.fordham.edu/der.nsf/id/sbay-953svl/$File/pb0219.pdf.
30.
See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement of FCC Chairman Julius
Genachowski on FCC Granting the First Authorization of Testing in the 1755-1780 MHz Band
(Aug. 14, 2012), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2012/db0814/DOC315799A1.pdf; Phil Goldstein, FCC Allows T-Mobile to Test Spectrum Sharing in 1755-1780
MHz Band, FIERCEWIRELESS (Aug. 15, 2012), http://www.fiercewireless.com/ story/fcc-allows-t-mobile-test-spectrum-sharing-1755-1780-mhz-band/2012-08-15.
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government-issued exclusive licenses.31 This effort will open 300 MHz of
spectrum currently licensed to television broadcasters by 2014 for use by
incumbent wireless service providers.32 In addition, some contested fraction
of this newly cleared band will be devoted to unlicensed use by smart spectrum sharing devices.33 The debate among policymakers and scholars today
is just how much of the cleared spectrum should be devoted to unlicensed
use.34
The second rulemaking would make a large swath of the 5 GHz band
available for unlicensed “ultra-high-speed, high-capacity Wi-Fi” use by anyone with certain kinds of devices.35 Under the Act, the FCC can only permit
use of unlicensed devices if current licensed uses are “protected by technical
solutions, including use of existing, modified, or new spectrum sharing technologies” and the “primary mission of federal spectrum users” in that band
“will not be compromised by the introduction of unlicensed devices.”36
B. The New Orthodoxy in Spectrum Administration
These reforms have been years in the making, but they nevertheless represent a significant shift from the approach that prevailed during most of
the twentieth century.37 Prior to these most recent reforms, the most pertinent changes came in the 1980s when the FCC authorized a limited set of
devices to operate without licenses in certain spectrum bands. This effort
made possible such things as cordless phones, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi.38
31.
Incentive Auctions NPRM, supra note 5; see also Middle Class Tax Relief and Job
Creation Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112–96, 126 Stat. 156. Together, the major over-the-air broadcasters meanwhile stand to make nearly two billion dollars through them. See Fostering Innovation and Investment in the Wireless Communications Market, 33 (2009), available at http://
newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/PISC_09-157_COMMENTS.pdf.
32.
Incentive Auctions NPRM, supra note 4.
33.
See Marguerite Reardon, FCC Kicks Off Effort to Reclaim TV Spectrum for Wireless, CNET (Sept. 28, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57522584-38/
fcc-kicks-off-effort-to-reclaim-tv-spectrum-for-wireless/.
34.
See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Tech, Telecom Giants Take Sides as FCC Proposes Large
Public WiFi Networks, WASH. POST (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ business/
technology/tech-telecom-giants-take-sides-as-fcc-proposes-large-public-wifi-networks/2013/
02/03/eb27d3e0-698b-11e2-ada3-d86a4806d5ee_story.html; Jon Brodkin, No, Free Wi-Fi
Isn’t Coming to Every U.S. City, ARSTECHNICA (Feb. 4, 2013, 7:45 PM), http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2013/02/no-free-wi-fi-isnt-coming-to-every-us-city/.
35.
U-NII NPRM, supra note 5, at 1819.
36.
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 47 U.S.C. § 1453 (a)(2)
(2012).
37.
The FCC, for example, had implemented unlicensed spectrum use regimes as early
as 1938. See, e.g., FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 16, at
7.
38.
See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.215-15.255 (2013); see also Revision of Part 15 of the Rules
Regarding the Operation of Radio Frequency Devices Without an Individual License, 4 FCC
Rcd. 3493 (1989). In the early to mid-1990s, the agency also designated small bands of spectrum for unrestricted, low power, use. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 15.301-15.323 (2013).
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In addition, the FCC significantly transformed the market in 1997 when
it authorized unlicensed use in certain spectrum bands allocated for spectrum
sharing technologies.39 Essentially, these rules set specific power limits in
the designated spectrum bands and required devices operating at those bands
to transmit nothing more than necessary.40 Soon afterward, the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the preeminent nongovernmental standard-setting body, approved Wi-Fi standards for public and commercial use in the late 1990s.41 At that point, Wi-Fi took off, appearing
prominently at venues such as Starbucks and airports across the country.
This success set the stage for further innovations to network design infrastructure and wireless digital transmission technology that, in turn, has made
broadband service more available in more places. These improvements also
have triggered the extraordinary proliferation of smartphone and tablet
applications.
Along the way, a persuasive chorus of legal scholars and economists has
been making the case for abandoning the centralized exclusive licensing regime and systematically incorporating shared spectrum technology into federal spectrum administration policy.42 To be sure, scholars had criticized the
licensing regime as inefficient just a generation after Congress created it.43
In a provocative 1959 article, economist Ronald Coase argued that Congress
was mistaken when it created a centralized comparative hearing licensure
regime for spectrum assignment in the 1920s.44 Through this system, he argued, broadcasters obtained spectrum use rights for the price of political
obsequiousness. The unrestrained price mechanism, he argued, would be
more efficient at assigning and distributing spectrum use rights because it
39.
See, e.g., Incentive Auctions NPRM, supra note 5 (amending 47 C.F.R. Pts. 1, 2, &
15).
40.
See 47 C.F.R. § 15.407.
41.
See WOLTER LEMSTRA ET AL., THE INNOVATION JOURNEY OF WI-FI: THE ROAD TO
GLOBAL SUCCESS (Cambridge 2010); FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N SPECTRUM POLICY TASK
FORCE, supra note 16, at 14.
42.
See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, TELECOSM: HOW INFINITE BANDWIDTH WILL REVOLUTIONIZE OUR WORLD (2000); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FACT OF THE
COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (1999); Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the
Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, supra note 4; Eli Noam, Spectrum Auctions: Yesterday’s Heresy, Today’s Orthodoxy, Tomorrow’s Anachronism. Taking the Next
Step to Open Spectrum Access, 41 J.L. & ECON. 765 (1998); Werbach, supra note 4; George
Gilder, Auctioning The Airwaves, FORBES, Apr. 11, 1994, available at http://www.seas.upenn.
edu/~gaj1/auctngg.html. In fact, researchers have recognized the potential of smart spectrum
management technologies for decades now. See MARVIN K. SIMON ET AL., SPREAD SPECTRUM
COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 47 (1994).
43.
See e.g., Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON.
1 (1959); Leo Herzel, “Public Interest” and the Market in Color Television Regulation, 18
CHIC. L. REV. 802 (1951). Coase’s article foreshadowed the publication of the groundbreaking
article for which is most commonly identified. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
44.
See Coase, supra note 43, at 32-34.
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allows broadcasters to pay the objective price for what they think the spectrum is worth.45 Real costs and market incentives, he explained, are not as
fickle as arbitrary agency fiat.46 Through competitive bidding, moreover, the
FCC could capture the real worth of frequencies in cash that it could then
direct to other worthwhile government projects.
Coase’s critique was prescient. Historians have suggested that the command-and-control regime for broadcast regulation and licensing was not the
most efficient or objective way of assigning licenses.47 Huge swaths of the
spectrum were unused or underutilized.48 The Commission very rarely denied an application for a license renewal,49 effectively administering until at
least the 1980s a corruptible system of private property preservation for the
large incumbent broadcast networks.
As correct as Coase was, it took Congress almost four decades to begin
substituting competitive bidding for the comparative hearing regime for
most wireless services.50The FCC further liberalized spectrum administration policy when it permitted auction awardees to sell or license their winnings in a secondary market.51 But for the limited duration of these
auctioned licenses, Congress and the FCC have effectively realized Coase’s
proposal for a property regime for federal spectrum administration.
Ever since authorized auctions, a generation of legal scholars and economists has been arguing for further reform.52 They cite smart spectrum sharing technologies as objective evidence that Coase was right; by the late
1990s, innovations in computation capacity in handheld devices, networked
communications, and wireless broadband network technology had rendered
command-and-control licensing obsolete.53 In 1998, for example, Eli Noam
argued that auctions, while a good idea, did not liberalize federal spectrum
administration policy enough. Smart sharing technologies opened the spec45.
See id. at 19.
46.
See id. at 18.
47.
ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MEANS OF ASCENT 90 (1991)
(“If there was a single year of maximum susceptibility to congressional pressures at the FCC,
it was 1943, the year in which Lady Bird Johnson purchased her radio station. In 1943, the
Commission was fighting with Congress not over increases in its budget or definitions of its
power, but for its very existence.”); James L. Baughman, TELEVISION’ S GUARDIANS: THE FCC
AND THE POLITICS OF PROGRAMMING, 1958-1967, 11, 13 (1985).
48.
Hazlett & Leo, supra note 3, at 1092.
49.
RICHARD BUNCE, TELEVISION IN THE CORPORATE INTEREST 14 (1976).
50.
See generally Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the
Next Frontier of Property Rights, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 555 (2008) (speculating that
technological complexity has made reform in this area difficult). I will return to this below in
Part II.C.
51.
See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Dev. of Secondary Markets, 19 FCC Rcd. 17503 (2004). Before the auction regime, parties
have to obtain FCC approval before acquiring or selling the companies that had the licenses.
52.
See infra notes 54-57.
53.
See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 87-88 (2006).
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trum up to wider, more exhaustive use.54 He proposed that the FCC or,
better, some central clearinghouse could provision use rights for a fee.55 The
clearinghouse would charge users for whatever portion of the spectrum they
actually use over a given period of time.56
Noam’s article was an important contribution to the scholarship on federal spectrum administration. Before, scholars focused almost exclusively on
whether the FCC ought to rationalize and prescribe exclusive use in the first
instance. Now that smart spectrum sharing technologies are ascendant,
scholars writing in this area have focused on the extent to which federal
spectrum policy should be based on a model of propriety, exclusive licensing through auctioning or open, unlicensed, use.57
One set of scholars argues that the new technologies have effectively
transformed the spectrum resource into a nearly inexhaustible public good.58
The FCC, they argue, should facilitate innovation and cooperation on device
specific problems such as harmful interference and battery power, and less
on the development of a regime of quasi-property rights in spectrum.59 For
example, Yochai Benkler argues that the FCC should employ exclusive licensing reluctantly. Unlicensed use regimes, he asserts, lower entry costs
for device manufacturers and application developers. The incumbent service
providers no longer assert exclusive control over coveted spectrum bands or
the devices through which they provide service. Accordingly, sharing protocols and standards would disintermediate the wireless market by allowing
developers (commercial and amateur alike) to develop new mobile transceivers, services, and applications at a lower cost.60
Although most observers recognize that some unlicensed use should be
permitted and incorporated into federal spectrum policy, there has been
some sobering pushback among legal scholars and economists. These economists have argued that unqualified, unlicensed use would create uncertainty
about the availability of spectrum and, as a result, cause a disincentive to
innovate and invest in the network infrastructure necessary to provide new
services.61 Others have argued that auction winners should be able to acquire
something close to fee simple property rights in spectrum that, in turn, they

54.
See Noam, supra note 42, at 769.
55.
See id. at 780-81.
56.
See id. at 781.
57.
See Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally
Networked Environment, supra note 4, at 359; Buck, supra note 4, ¶ 38.
58.
See Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally
Networked Environment, supra note 4, at 361-62.
59.
See id., at 333-36.
60.
BENKLER, supra note 53, at 87-88, 88 n.11.
61.
See, e.g., BAUMOL & ROBYN, supra note 3; Benjamin, supra note 3; Hazlett, supra
note 3; Hazlett & Leo, supra note 3; Robinson, supra note 3.
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can sell in whole or in part in a secondary market.62 Even if government see
a public interest in demarcating certain networks for unlicensed use, these
critics explain, governments would have to enlist service providers to administer access to them.63
This resistance to unlicensed use, mostly from law and economics scholars, has given rise to the mixed approach currently adopted by the FCC.
Today, the agency licenses commercial use of most of the spectrum over
which it has jurisdiction. But, under the new orthodoxy, the FCC also recognizes the utility of spectrum sharing technology in certain limited bands.
The most prominent example of these is the frequency bands reserved for
Wi-Fi. These pockets of the spectrum are growing, but are still smaller than
those that remain subject to the auctioned spectrum-as-property approach.
These law and economics critics would rather see an auction regime of
clear property rights, in which providers would actually have an incentive to
build network infrastructure and sell or assign secondary uses.64 After all,
the existence of smart spectrum sharing technologies does not resolve the
problem of building and maintaining efficient wireless networks for massmarket use. Even the most agile of technologies will never redress “willful
or malicious interference.”65 As the technology becomes smarter, scholars
have argued, there will likely be a heightened need for a clear, dynamic, and
enforceable regime of property rights.66
Despite the pushback, the FCC is nonetheless moving quickly to redress
the high demand for spectrum by making meaningful swaths of the spectrum
available for unlicensed use. This response by the agency is a testament to
its recognition of the remarkable advances and rapid deployment of smart
spectrum technologies, in spite of the law and economics critique.67 And, as
the technology matures, advocates of unlicensed use have proposed schemes
for its effective administration. Most proposals suggest managing unlicensed use through collaboration among service providers, device manufacturers, and trade groups. According to the PCAST reform proposal—to
date, the most prominent governmental proposal for unlicensed use administration—a consortium of commercial providers would operate a federal
“Spectrum Access System” (SAS) in collaboration with the federal regula-

62.
See John W. Mayo & Scott J. Wallsten, Secondary Spectrum Markets as Complements to Incentive Auctions, SELECTEDWORKS OF SCOTT J. WALLSTEN, June 2011, at 3, available at http://works.bepress.com/scott_wallsten/68/.
63.
See PCAST Report, supra note 15, at 15, 24.
64.
See, e.g., BAUMOL & ROBYN, supra note 3, at 63; Hazlett & Leo, supra note 3, at
1066, 1070-71; Robinson, supra note 3, at 619–20.
65.
See 47 U.S.C. § 333 (2012) (regulating willful or malicious interference).
66.
See Hazlett & Leo, supra note 3, at 1079-80.
67.
See Benkler, Open Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market Adoption, supra note 4, at 163.
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tors.68 The SAS would be an information and control clearinghouse for registrations and conditions of use in certain specified spectrum bands.69
The PCAST proposal owes much to the few legal scholars who have
given considerable thought to unlicensed use administration. Philip Weiser
and Dale Hatfield, for example, argue that the FCC should consider applying
existing regulations that already govern harmful interference under the
agency’s current certification and registration standards for unlicensed devices.70 The FCC could deputize an established nongovernmental standard
setting organization like the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
to develop further functional requirements for devices.71 These rules,
Weiser and Hatfield concede, might have some effect of diminishing the
incentive to innovate, but they argue that this is the cost of assuring a quality
of service that can compete realistically with extant broadband service.72
On the other hand, Stuart Buck has advocated a system of “co-management” between the FCC and nongovernmental stakeholders. In such an arrangement, he argues, the agency would draw clear boundaries on spectrum
allocation, formulate clear rules about who may participate in deliberations
about use, manage the standard-setting process generally, provide information about institutional arrangements and technical standards, and, where appropriate, enforce violations of law.73
Other proposals have not been as nuanced as those of Weiser and
Hatfield or Buck.74 Some argue, for example, for a centralized database that
68.
See PCAST REPORT, supra note 15, at 15, 24.
69.
Id. at 15.
70.
Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 FORD. L.
REV. 663, 688-91 (2005) (discussing 47 C.F.R. § 15 (2005)).
71.
See id. at 689-90.
72.
Id. at 689. They accordingly recommend that experimentation be permitted in some
spectrum bands, while other bands allow “more wide-ranging uses.” Id. at 689-90. Weiser and
Hatfield acknowledge that, historically, the FCC has not been a good enforcer of certification
or registration requirements in the event of jamming or hogging by unauthorized and even
certified users. They recommend that the FCC just begin bringing enforcement actions for
willful or malicious interference, even as they concede that such an effort probably be difficult
in light of the decentralized nature and diversity of spectrum sharing devices. The agency
accordingly would enlist volunteers in local communities to act as de facto enforcement deputies. Id. at 693 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 101 (2005) rules on dispute resolution between licensed
users of spectrum).
73.
Buck, supra note 4, ¶ 41; see also id. ¶¶ 44-77 (drawing from ELINOR OLSTROM,
GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1990)).
74.
By his own account, Benkler has not offered any detailed plan on how interference
in unlicensed use regimes would be monitored and effectively prohibited. See Benkler, Open
Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market Adoption, supra note 4, at 90. His
proposal, such as it is, would have the FCC develop a wireless device certification process that
complies with “minimal non-harmfulness requirements” established by standard setting organizations like the IEEE. Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 77-78 (2002). An alternative system, he argues, would be administered by a nongovernmental public trust that would also permit devices that meet minimal
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could identify and make available spectrum in discrete geographic locations.75 Others are far less sanguine about any positive role for the FCC or
any centralized federal administration regime.76 They would leave such
matters chiefly to property law.77
Underlying all these approaches is the assumption that policymakers
would, at best, only be charged with developing the “rules of the road” to
facilitate dealings and adjudicate disputes between stakeholders.78 Proponents of this view argue that government’s only function in this area is to
make things work.79
These proposals all have significant merits, but all offer scant guidance
on how to integrate the administration of spectrum policy in conventional
public lawmaking processes. Spectrum policy has taken its most recent turn
away from centralized command-and-control largely because the policymakers and scholars who argue for reform have understood federal spectrum
administration policy to be solely an instrumentalist, problem-solving endeavor.80 Technological scarcity and interference are the problems for
which, they argue, smart spectrum sharing technologies provide an objective
remedy. Now that smart spectrum sharing technologies can deliver nearabundance, they argue, there is little left for the FCC or any other governmental entity to do. It is no wonder, therefore, that some scholars argue for
removing the FCC from the business of spectrum administration
altogether.81
sharing standards. Id. at 78. Benkler associates this loose framework with the comprehensive
one set out by Philip Weiser and Dale Hatfield. Benkler, Open Wireless vs. Licensed Spectrum: Evidence from Market Adoption, supra note 4, at 90 n. 109 (citing Weiser & Hatfield,
supra note 74).
75.
See Michael Calabrese, The End of Spectrum ‘Scarcity’: Building on the TV Bands
Database to Access Unused Public Airwaves 8-9 (New Am. Found., Working Paper No. 25,
2009).
76.
See Werbach, supra note 4, at 920-23 (looking to property law generally for enforcement against interfering or harmful devices and uses).
77.
See id.
78.
See, e.g., Promoting Interoperability in the 700 MHz Commercial Spectrum, 27
FCC Rcd. 3521 (2012); see also Michael Calabrese, The Need for Well-Defined yet NonExclusive Radio Operating Rights, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 512, 512-13 (2011);
Gregory Rosston & Scott Wallsten, Economic Principles for Ex Ante Rules for Radio, 9 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 509, 509 (2011); Kevin Werbach, Castle in the Air: A Domain
Name System for Spectrum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 613 (2010). See generally PCAST REPORT,
supra note 15, at 27.
79.
See, e.g., Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, supra note 4, at 91.
80.
They overlook, for example, the intrinsic value of public participation in the public
lawmaking processes. See infra Part III.
81.
See, e.g., PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC
AND LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997); Thomas Hazlett, Optimal Abolition of
FCC Spectrum Allocation, 22 J. ECON. PERSP. 103 (2008); Lawrence Lessig, Reboot the FCC,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 22, 2008, reprinted in THE DAILY BEAST, available at http://www.
thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/12/22/reboot-the-fcc.html.
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In Part Two below, I contextualize the prevailing view of federal spectrum administration by describing the reasons on which reformers in the
1920s—the formative era for federal administration—relied to make their
institutional choices for administering spectrum use. I argue that, until Congress authorized competitive bidding only two decades ago, legislators and
policymakers generally believed that spectrum administration was a geographically contingent endeavor that required local public input. They consistently averred that licensing decisions could not be left to engineers, the
licensees themselves, or even to the FCC without the consideration of the
affected local communities. This history underscores how utterly silent current approaches are on how to integrate unlicensed use administration in
public lawmaking today. This analysis sets the stage for Part Three, where I
will attempt to recapture some of what was good about these early efforts in
a way that will put U.S. federal spectrum administration back on track.
The historical account that the Article providers here is important because it demonstrates that legal scholars and policymakers have faced the
very same questions about how to structure federal spectrum administration
before and resolved to go a different way. This account invites the question:
why excise local community participation from federal spectrum administration? The answer might simply be that it is not necessary for the objective
operation of the technology—public participation would only render federal
spectrum administration inefficient. And, in this way, the spectrum-as-property and unlicensed use approaches have more in common than they admit.
But the answer to the question would do more: it would also force scholars
to confront the question of whether and when public participation is ever
necessary in public lawmaking. As I show in Part III, necessity and convenience have almost always taken a backseat to a core normative and structural interest in public participation in public lawmaking.
II. THE TRANSFORMATION

OF

SPECTRUM ADMINISTRATION

In the Communications Act, Congress gave the FCC broad authority to
“encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest.”82 This was not an unlimited “standard of judgment,” however; it was to
be implemented through the comparative hearing processes.83 The FCC’s
authority, moreover, was addressed to more than “technical and engineering” matters.84 The agency’s role was to ensure that broadcast licensees provide the “best practicable service to the community reached by its
broadcasts.”85 Comparative hearings were to be the forums through which
82.
83.
84.
85.
U.S. 470,

NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943) (citing 47 U.S.C. 303(g) (1942)).
Id.
Id. at 217.
Id. at 216 (quoting Fed. Commc’ns. Comm’s. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309
475 (1940)).
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local listeners, elected officials, civic groups, and businesses could weigh in.
They could petition to have a license application denied if the applicant
could not demonstrate a commitment to the local “public interest.”86
As I explain in Part II.B., Congress replaced comparative hearings with
the competitive bidding processes in the 1990s in order to redress economic
rent-seeking and other well-documented inefficiencies and administrative
problems that were incident to the nearly unqualified (but not unintelligible)
authority to attend to the “public interest.” Despite this, the broad “standard
of judgment” remains a feature of the statutory scheme for competitive bidding at the FCC; Congress never repealed it.87 The auction provisions explicitly invoke the original high-minded language of the Communications
Act in provisions addressing auction design, substantive regulations related
to auctions, and the agency’s consideration of auction revenues.88 Competitive bidding only replaced the comparative hearing process for a limited
range of spectrum uses, including certain telecommunications services and
broadcasting. Under the current law governing auctions, the FCC continues
to have expansive authority to assign licenses to nongovernmental entities
and condition those licenses to prevent interference.89 The auction provisions did nothing to diminish the standard of judgment on which the agency
must rely to do exercise this authority.
The reforms to spectrum auctions and administration that scholars and
policymakers advocate today fail to acknowledge this legal and institutional
history. The recent report by PCAST, for example, mentions the “public
interest” just once and is completely silent on public participation, as though
that period in communications policymaking history never happened. For
their part, the developers of unlicensed use technologies have little incentive
to do anything more than deploy popular devices, services, and applications,
no matter their claims of enlightened benevolence.
This failure on the part of scholars and regulators is not apocryphal. At
a minimum, however, it suggests something very important about the emergent approach. There is little doubt that the command-and-control public
interest hearings of the twentieth century were flawed. But this Article argues that they were not as ineffective as their near-complete removal from
spectrum policymaking suggests. I assert that an important but forgotten
lesson of spectrum policymaking in the twentieth century is that it can be a

86.
47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (2012).
87.
See, e.g., id. §§ 309(a), 309(j), 310(d).
88.
Id. §§ 309(j)(3), 309(j)(4)(c), 309(j)(7).
89.
See id. §§ 301, 303(b), 303(g), 303(r); see also id. § 316(a)(1) (FCC may modify
existing licenses if such action “will promote the public interest, convenience, and necessity”).
By comparison, the Communications Act confers on the President (and, by extension, the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the Commerce Department)
the power to authorize spectrum use by federal agencies. See id. § 305(a).
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community-building endeavor as much as an instrumentalist, problem-solving one.
In the end, this may sound like nothing more than an elaborate lament
about the damage that the spectrum sharing technologies have wrought to a
romantic view of how things were in the golden age of broadcasting. But
this Article intends something different. It argues that public participation is
important in order to facilitate the organic incorporation of the new spectrum
administration technologies into public life. It is a process of discovery, for
local communities as much as policymakers.
A. Command-and-Control Exclusive Licensing
The emergent proposals for reform represent a radical departure from
the command-and-control licensing regime set out by Congress almost nine
decades ago. The drafters of the 1927 Radio Act, the defining precursor of
the current statute, were reluctant to do anything short of conferring broad
licensing powers to an all-powerful federal agency.90 Policymakers and casual radio listeners had become exasperated with the hundreds of broadcasters competing for a scarce number of available frequencies allocated for
commercial broadcasting.91 Back then, advocates and policymakers were
concerned that the airwaves had become a free-for-all in which all manner of
broadcaster, amateur or network-affiliate, could use any frequency desired to
reach audiences. This was a relatively new ecosystem with various broadcasters relying on different models for spectrum management and program
content development.92
Policymakers in the 1920s responded by creating a centralized government administered institution for assigning licenses, defining permitted uses,
and revoking licenses. They did this with the lofty ambition of stemming
airwave chaos. Reformers believed that anything less than a centralized
government overhaul of spectrum administration would not resolve the
cacophony of signals. Command-and-control, they concluded, would be a
remedy for disorder over the airwaves.93
These advocates of “radio control” were not completely correct. First,
frequency scarcity was an incident of the Commerce Department’s decision
to allocate only a few frequencies for military and shipping purposes in the
90.
See, e.g., Radio Control Bill Covers Wide Range, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1927, at 17.
91.
See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 376 (1969) (“Without government
control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacophony of competing voices,
none of which could be clearly and predictably heard.”).
92.
See Susan Crawford, The Radio and the Internet, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 992
(2008).
93.
See ERIK BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE
UNITED STATES TO 1933, VOL. 1 199 (1966); Olivier Sylvain, Domesticating “the Great,
Throbbing, Common Pulse of America”: A Study of the Ideological Origins of the Radio Act
of 1927 24 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
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1910s and then to public and commercial broadcasting in the 1920s. It simply chose not to allocate large portions of the electromagnetic spectrum.
The hundreds of potential licensees had no choice but to share a very narrow
band of frequencies. Second, scarcity is a fact of almost all of economic life.
Neither frequency scarcity nor signal interference could alone justify a centralized licensure regime or Congressional action.94 The technical design of
transmitters and receivers compounded the problem of interference, but,
even in the early 1920s, some reformers appreciated that innovations could
eventually fix the problems.95
Not unlike today, reformers in the 1920s chose from several alternative
institutional designs to address the interference problem. Where modernday scholars, Congress, and officials at the FCC have committed to the
mixed, spectrum-as-property and unlicensed use approach, reformers in the
formative era chose centralized control. But they could have chosen other
alternatives. These early reformers could have developed a government-administered adjudication process through local registration bureaus on the basis of the model of public land disposal during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.96 The 1862 Homestead Act, the first and most notable of these,
sought to promote land ownership among farmers. The arguments about
how public land should be distributed for private use by the federal government are strikingly similar to those associated with wireless policy today:
some favored land distribution as a source of revenue for the federal Treasury Department, while others favored giving title to land away for free or at
a nominal price in order to promote a small land-holding rural society.97
Reformers also could have left disputes over signal interference to the
interested private parties themselves. For centuries, principles in the AngloAmerican common law tradition supplied the background rules on which
people and institutions assumed property rights and duties in relation to each
other. These principles could presumably have done the same for frequency
use in the 1920s. In 1926, for example, an Illinois state court in Tribune Co.
v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting turned to “analogous cases and equitable principles” to conclude that a broadcast licensee had “a superiority in right” over a
broadcaster who used the same frequency.98 Relying chiefly on unfair competition principles and cases concerning running water rights in the western
United States, the court found that the plaintiff licensee’s property rights
94.
Sylvain, supra note 93, at 24.
95.
ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 114 (1984).
96.
See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 121-37 (2012).
97.
BENJAMIN HORACE HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC LAND POLICIES 362
(1965).
98.
Tribune Co. v. Oak Leaves Broad. Station, Inc. (Ill. Cir. Ct. Nov. 17, 1926), reprinted in 68 Cong. Rec. 215, 219 (1926). See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Oak Leaves and
the Origins of the 1927 Radio Act: Comment, 95 PUB. CHOICE 277, 279 (1998).

140

Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review

[Vol. 20:121

arose largely out of the duration of time he held the frequency and its commercial development.99 The defendant, on the other hand, was “newly in the
field and [would] not suffer as a result of an injunction in proportion to the
damage that would be sustained by the complainant.”100 In lieu of some
legislative intervention by the federal government, the Oak Leaves court
found that broadcast licensees could rely on “equitable principles” in common law to protect their ostensible property interest in the licensed
frequency.101
Such an approach was not uncommon in the early 1920s. Courts already had resolved that Congress had not granted federal agencies any real
discretion in administering or awarding licenses.102 At most, the Commerce
Department could only select times and wavelengths in order to minimize
interference and, as such, could only act as a kind of registration bureau.103
The logic of the then-governing 1912 Act was simply to rationalize distribution and access to the spectrum for safe naval and civilian maritime uses.104
The Department’s role, the courts explained, was purely ministerial; it was
to issue licenses to whomever asked. The Oak Leaves court believed, therefore, that it had no choice but to apply common law property principles.
These two approaches—centralized executive administration of licensing on the one hand and a relatively laissez faire forbearance on the other—
encapsulated the limited range of choices that reformers believed they had at
their disposal in the 1920s. Reformers, after all, could not have anticipated
the spectrum sharing technologies of today. Yet they addressed a version of
the very same problem in the context of the debate over unlicensed and
spectrum-as-property approaches. In the end, reformers in 1927 chose centralization over laissez faire forbearance. Commerce Secretary Herbert
Hoover and other reformers mobilized an effort in the early to mid-1920s to
enlarge and consolidate federal control over the airwaves. Hoover explained
that, if these courts were right and the Commerce Department did not have
the authority to assign wavelengths and impose time-of-day limits, broadcasters could proceed to make their own self-interested choices at the expense of order and any regard for public service generally.105 A new radio
99.
68 Cong. Rec. 215, 219 (1926).
100.
Id.
101.
See Jora R. Minasian, The Political Economy of Broadcasting in the 1920s, 12 J.L.
& ECON. 391 (1969). Some have gone further, and argued that licensees, after Oak Leaves in
particular, could negotiate the terms of conveyance and use to subsequent licensees as if it was
theirs to sell. See Paul M. Segal & Harry P. Warner, Ownership of Broadcasting Frequencies:
A Review, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 111, 113, 121 (1947).
102.
See Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1923); United
States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614, 617 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
103.
See Hoover, 286 F. at 1007. But see Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d at 617 (finding that
department had any discretion over licensing or even time-of-day and wavelength assignment).
104.
Hoover, 286 F. at 1005.
105.
Text of Ruling Denying Radio Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1926, at 5.
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law could redress this problem, Hoover argued, by empowering a federal
agency to determine “who may broadcast,” prescribe a standard for the administration of these decisions, and further the interests of listeners and of
the industry.106
After years of trying, Congress passed a bill in 1927 in which a new
agency, the Federal Radio Commission (the FCC’s predecessor), would have
complete control over wireless communications.107 The FRC was to be
composed of five impartial members. Together, they would have the quasijudicial authority to award frequency licenses to applicants with a demonstrable commitment to the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” in
their programming and operations.108
The logic on which reformers relied to substantiate the FRC’s broad
authority has important implications for current debates about spectrum-asproperty and unlicensed use approaches: the spectrum, those early reformers
explained, is “public property” that could not be abused for “private gain.”109
The federal government, through the Commission, preemptively asserted a
monopoly over broadcast spectrum in order to ensure that licensees act as
the public’s trustees.110 Under the new law, the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” would be the standard to guide regulation and measure broadcasters’ programming.111
The statute said very little about how the “public interest” should be
interpreted or what the phrase meant with any particularity. Critics and proponents at the time both recognized that it was an ambiguous legal standard.112 More recent critics have rejected the public interest standard as
dangerously “vacuous” or, worse, the representation of premeditated legisla-

106.
Hoover Sees Chaos without Radio Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1926, at 5.
107.
Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. After one year, the FRC would have
only final appellate authority, while the Secretary of Commerce would be the licensing administrator in the first instance. See Associated Press, U.S. Radio Control Legislation Ready for
Congress Vote, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1927, at 4. Congress amended the law in 1928 so that the
Commerce Department really played no part in broadcast regulation. See Act of March 28,
1928, ch. 263, 45 Stat. 373.
108.
Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
109.
Radio Regulation Is Urged by Hoover, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1924, at 1; see also
Implementation of FCC Spectrum Auctions: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Budget, 103d
Cong. 7 (1994) (testimony of Chairman Reed Hundt).
110.
Cf. Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 990, 1041-66 (1989) (arguing that government ownership of the broadcast spectrum
violates the First Amendment).
111.
See generally NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L. LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1995).
112.
67 CONG. REC. 12,355 (1926); see also Radio Control: Hearings on S. 1 and S.
1754 Before the Comm. On Interstate Commerce, 69th Cong. 37 (1926) [hereinafter Radio
Control Hearings] (testimony of Stephen Davis, Solicitor of the Department of Commerce).
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tive quid pro quo between legislators and the major industry players that the
FRC was to regulate.113
The historical record bears this latter point out: from 1927 to the 1990s,
few, if any, large broadcast incumbents ever actually lost their licenses.114
There is also every reason to believe that the public interest standard helped
to justify Secretary Hoover’s own strong preference for having the proverbial Radio Trust (i.e., RCA, Westinghouse, General Electric, and AT&T)
develop the institutional logic for broadcasting. Those companies already
had secured comfortable dominance in the markets for radio sets and other
hardware by 1927 through a series of exclusive patent pools.115 Station interconnection technologies developed by Westinghouse, RCA, and AT&T, led
almost immediately to the creation of the National Broadcasting Company
and all the attendant network agreements and programming that came to
define broadcasting in the decades that followed.116
In the end, Hoover and the reformers agreed to give the FRC the administrative discretion to interpret the “public interest” standard on a case-bycase basis.117 This, they believed, was the best way to rationalize spectrum
use.118 In 1933, the Court upheld the FRC’s authority over a nondelegation
doctrine challenge, explaining that the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” standard did not confer an “indefinite” or “unlimited power.”119
The standard, the Court continued, was sufficiently circumscribed to protect
against “official favoritism” but broad enough to ensure that the agency had
“the authority to make a fair and equitable allocation” of licenses.120
Congress reformed this administrative regime in the 1934 Communications Act, but not to further define the “public interest” standard explicitly.
Through the new statute, legislators consolidated in a new federal agency the
authority to administer spectrum policy (formerly delegated to the FRC
through the 1927 Act) and telephony and telegraphy (formerly delegated to
the ICC through the 1910 Mann-Elkins Act). Under the statute, the new
FCC obtained authority to minimize signal interference, “make a fair and
equitable allocation” of licenses, and give interested members of the public
113.
See Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and
Regulatory Purpose, in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 14
(Max D. Paglin, ed., Oxford 1989); see also Hazlett, supra note 81, at 103.
114.
Jennifer M. Proffitt & Michael Brown, Regulating the Radio Monopoly: Ewin Davis
and His Legislative Debates, 1923-1928, 11 J. RADIO STUD. 100, 109 (2004).
115.
ROBERT BRITT HORWITZ, THE IRONY OF REGULATION REFORM: THE DEREGULATION
OF AMERICAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS 116-17 (1988).
116.
Sylvain, supra note 93, at 20-21, 45-48.
117.
See Radio Control Hearings, supra note 112 (testimony of Stephen Davis, Solicitor
of the Department of Commerce).
118.
Id.
119.
Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortg., 289 U.S. 266, 285 (1933)
(citing N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932)).
120.
Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 540 (1935).
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an opportunity to argue in a hearing against the award of a license to any
given applicant.121
When faced with a challenge to the new statute in 1943, the Court reiterated that the FCC’s authority was sufficiently cabined by the “public interest” standard and statutorily defined administrative procedures.122 In NBC v.
U.S., the Court reviewed FCC regulations of “chain broadcasting” arrangements between the major broadcast networks and affiliated local stations.
Those agreements basically gave local broadcast stations the right to air a
single network’s content fare (in this case, NBC’s) to the exclusion of all
programming by other networks. The Court held that the agency could promulgate such rules and that the underlying congressional delegation was not
too broad.123
The Court recognized that the problem of frequency scarcity was the
chief rationale for the regulatory arrangement; radio frequencies, it explained, are too scarce “to be left to wasteful use without detriment to the
public interest.”124 The Court understood the “public interest” standard to be
a benchmark through which Congress conferred on the agency the authority
to rationalize unforeseeable uses of such a scarce but potentially dynamic
resource.125
After NBC v. U.S., frequency scarcity was a prominent justification for
the FCC’s broad authority over broadcasting for most of the twentieth century, allowing the agency to regulate, among other things, license renewals
and technical transmission terms.126 It even provided the basis for content
regulation of broadcasting, an otherwise difficult terrain for government
agencies to regulate lawfully as a constitutional matter.127
B. Local Public Participation
Frequency scarcity was never the only supporting rationale for legislative intervention, however, although it was the justification on which most
legislators appeared to rely in the 1920s. Nor did scarcity require Congress
to create a federal agency whose charge was to award exclusive licenses on
the basis of “the public interest, convenience, and necessity.” The impetus
for such large scale, command-and-control regulatory intervention was more
ambitious.
121.
See 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (d)-(e) (2012).
122.
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943).
123.
Id. at 216 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 303(g)).
124.
Id. at 216, 218.
125.
Id. at 219.
126.
See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (rejecting First Amendment
challenge to “fairness doctrine” regulation of broadcast content because spectrum frequencies
are scarce).
127.
Id.
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The early reformers believed that broadcasting was a “new art” that required something more subtle than the ministerial awarding of licenses.
Evoking the Progressive Era conception of enlightened government administration,128 the President and Congress would appoint FRC members for their
“understanding of the public’s interest, and particularly with a view to the
future development of the radio art for the social and economic good of our
people.”129
Reformers in the 1920s invoked the notion of scarcity to articulate a
view of broadcasting as a morally ambiguous artifact of modern life.130 After all, when it first appeared, radio competed with and potentially crowded
out more parochial and geographically contingent methods of mass communication like newspapers and movie halls. As such, for reformers and
policymakers throughout the twentieth century, interference was not just a
technological problem that required a regulatory fix. It was a salient metaphor for more general anxieties about the preservation of local community
life in the face of modernity. Reformers believed that other public interest
objectives, including the sovereign character of local communities, were
among the most paramount.131 As I explain in more detail below,132 this
early focus on localism has been lost in today’s most prominent reform proposals for federal spectrum administration policy.
Under the 1927 Radio Act, licensing decisions were conducted through
comparative hearings that, in effect, were community events in which local
civic groups, elected officials, and businesses could weigh in on the merits
of a potential broadcaster’s application to build and operate a local station.133
Applicants would have to prove their value to the communities to which
they intended to transmit their signals. They would generally do this by
demonstrating their commitment to local priorities and institutions—often
by showcasing their support for local institutions and events.134 Local participation in the decision-making about how licensees ought to use the assigned frequencies was an important way of vindicating the public interest
objectives of the Radio Act. This localist approach was markedly different
than the wholly centralized system in Europe.135
That scarcity might have this grander meaning—one addressing more
than the problem of technological interference—squares with reformers’
128.
129.
130.
131.

See Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197 (1887).
67 CONG. REC. 12,358 (1926) (statement of Sen. Clarence Dill).
Id.
See ROBERT L. HILLIARD & MICHAEL C. KEITH, THE QUIET VOICE: THE RISE AND
DEMISE OF LOCALISM IN AMERICAN RADIO 25-26 (2005).
132.
See infra Parts II.D and III.
133.
See 47 U.S.C. § 309 (d)-(e) (2012). See generally Robert Buck, Comment, FCC
Comparative Renewal Hearings: The Role of the Commissions and the Role of the Court, 21
B.C. L. REV. 421, 422 (1980).
134.
See HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 131, at 25-26.
135.
Id. at 25.
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general approach to public policy problems in the period immediately following World War I. Interference was not just a technological problem for
which an engineering fix was necessary. It signified a threat to what Warren
Harding called “normalcy” in his Presidential campaign—that is, a threat to
traditional American life.136 Interference also appeared vividly in policy debates over immigration and transportation, as much as it did in the context of
spectrum administration.137 In this way, the 1927 Radio Act was only part of
a larger “Progressive Era” reform effort against the threat that modernity
posed to a certain vision of the American way of life. Through the Act, the
FRC would guard against the creeping threat to the sovereign character of
local communities. Most reformers, including Hoover, believed that, without
legislative intervention, programming aimed at rural audiences would be
crowded out by the powerful signals emanating from the large city stations.138 According to social historian Warren Susman, policymakers were
“haunted by the fears that the new urban, industrial world of mass communications would destroy real community.”139
To be clear, interference and scarcity was the uncontroversial reason
that Congress passed the 1927 law.140 Interference connoted the technological difficulty of accommodating all broadcasters who operated within the
same given frequency in a given community. But, just as importantly,
policymakers also meant to address the more general demographic transformations that had been underway since the very late nineteenth century. They
honed in on radio because it was the most conspicuous manifestation of
these changes. An explosion of new industry and amateur broadcasts
136.
Sylvain, supra note 93, at 183-86, 206-09. See generally PAUL BOYER, URBAN
MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920 at 266-84 (1978) (discussing progressivism, positive environmentalism, and the general moral tenor of social control efforts in cities in
the 1900s and 1910s); ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE GREAT WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR MODERN
ORDER: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THEIR INSTITUTIONS, 1917-1933 50, 58,
72-73 (1979) (discussing general concerns about fracturing of the social fabric in post-war
era).
137.
Sylvain, supra note 93, at 183-86, 206-09.
138.
The U.S. Senate Commerce Committee heard testimony from educators and agriculturists, for example, that addressed the ways in which stations in Chicago and New York
regularly interrupted over-the-air “courses of instruction in agriculture, home economics, and
general science subjects” for Kansas and southern New Jersey farmers. Radio Control Hearings, supra note 112; see also 1 EDWARD EYRE HUNT, RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES IN THE
UNITED STATES: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES OF THE PRESIDENT’S CONFERENCE ON UNEMPLOYMENT 322 (1929). Commerce Secretary Solicitor General
Stephen Davis testified that several dozen licensed stations jammed the airwaves in the fifty
mile radius area outside of Chicago. Radio Control Hearings, supra note 112.
139.
WARREN I. SUSMAN, CULTURE AS HISTORY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
SOCIETY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 257 (1985).
140.
The die was cast seven years earlier. In the lead-up to passing the 1927 Act, policymakers and reformers sought to develop an institutional framework for distributing rights to
use the spectrum because there was none of which to speak. Hugh G. J. Aitken, Allocating the
Spectrum: The Origins of Radio Regulation, 35 TECH. & CULTURE 686, 689 (1994).
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jammed the airwaves of local communities and, the argument went, crowded
out local community life.141 With the passage of the 1927 Act, Congress
intervened in order to mitigate the chaos. Its creation of the comparative
hearing process served as a bulwark against the threat that radio broadcasting generally posed to small town America.
Localism, along with competition and diversity, was one of the prominent “cornerstones of broadcast regulation” throughout the twentieth century.142 But its function from the 1960s to the 1990s was far more
substantive than procedural.143 The Supreme Court explained in the late
1960s, for example, that broadcasters owe a noble civic duty to their local
audiences to provide “suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and
other ideas and experiences” due largely to their structural gatekeeping
function.144
In a 1994 case involving the FCC’s regulation of competition in the
market for video programming, the Court upheld an agency rule that required cable operators to carry local broadcast signals.145 Free over-the-air
local television, the Court explained, is one of the important interests that
overcome First Amendment concerns about agency regulation of commercial speech. Free over-the-air local broadcasting, it held, was essential to the
operation of democracy.146 Even into the early 2000s, when interest in substantive localism as such began to wane, the Commission expressed its interest in “promoting localism in broadcasting” through such things as public
interest obligations, license renewals, and protecting the rights of local stations to make programming decision for their communities.147
Reformers in the 1920s did not invoke scarcity merely as an engineering
justification for regulatory intervention. They recognized that accommodating local community sovereignty was an important institutional objective
because it gave purpose to a technology that was otherwise morally
ambiguous.148
The procedural sense of localism or geographic contingency embodied
in the comparative hearing is absent from the new orthodoxy in federal spec141.
PHILIP T. ROSEN, THE MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND THE FEDGOVERNMENT, 1920-1934 7 (1980) (noting that proliferation of technology “caused society to question its growth and expansion.”).
142.
See Broad. Localism, 19 FCC Rcd. 14849, 14849 (2004). See generally Cynthia
Conti, Accepting the Mutability of Broadcast Localism: An Analytic Position, 21 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 106 (2012).
143.
See, e.g., Editorializing Broadcast Licenses, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949) (making
case for regulation that imposes burden on broadcasters to provide adequate coverage of local
public issues). See generally Donald P. Mullally, The Fairness Doctrine: Benefits and Costs,
33 PUB. OPINION Q. 577, 577 (1970).
144.
Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
145.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994).
146.
See id.
147.
See generally HILLIARD & KEITH, supra note 131, at 99.
148.
Cf. Sylvain, supra note 6, at 830-31.
ERAL
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trum administration. Of course, we now know that the command-and-control regime for spectrum administration was not the most efficient way of
assigning licenses. Its history is rife with stories of capture and rent-seeking.149 Among the more notorious episodes involves Lady Bird Johnson’s
license to build and operate a radio station in Texas that she procured
through the influence of her powerful husband.150
This and other political trades were probably what Newton Minow, a
former FCC chairman, had in mind when he dubbed the period from the end
of World War Two to the mid-1960s the “whorehouse era” of broadcast
regulation.151 Spectrum licenses were, from this perspective, chits in the political horse-trading that characterized midcentury political life in Washington, D.C. The Commission rarely if ever denied an application for a license
renewal pursuant to local resistance to a noncommercial broadcaster on programming grounds, effectively making the licensure regime a system of private property preservation,152 at least until the 1980s. Accordingly, the
relative quality of the various programs that broadcasters aired was highly
variable, notwithstanding the Radio Act’s high-minded ambitions.153
That command-and-control public interest licensing was subject to political manipulation, however, is not a measure of the rightness of incorporating local community concerns in the agency decision-making about
spectrum use. Even today, most observers recognize that, during emergencies in particular, broadcast television stations serve a vital role by providing
local news and information to residents.154 Similarly, Congress’s decision to
incorporate local community participation as a matter of course in licensing
decisions contained crucial normative insights. The challenge for us today is
to recapture these insights while minimizing their flaws.155
C. Spectrum Auctions
Comparative hearings formed the basis of the FCC’s licensing decisions
for most of the twentieth century. Frequency scarcity was the governing
149.
See Thomas W. Hazlett, Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why
Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years, 41 J.L. & ECON. 529, 552 (1998). All but one
licensee in the history of broadcast regulation had its renewal application denied. See Buck,
supra note 133, at 423-24.
150.
CARO, supra note 47.
151.
FRED J. MACDONALD, ONE NATION UNDER TELEVISION: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
NETWORK TV 24 (1994).
152.
BUNCE, supra note 49, at 14.
153.
MACDONALD, supra note 151, at 106–29.
154.
See STEVE WALDMAN, WORKING GROUP ON INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES,
THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES: THE CHANGING MEDIA LANDSCAPE IN A BROADBAND AGE 76 (2011), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/osp/inc-report/The_Information_
Needs_of_Communities.pdf.
155.
Cf. John Fabien Witt, Two Conceptions of Suffering in War, in KNOWING THE SUFFERING OF OTHERS (Austin Sarat ed., forthcoming) (on file with author).
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rationale for this approach. But, as I explain above, that justification always
provided weak support for FCC intervention. To be sure, scarcity arose
from real concerns about interference. The resource was considered scarce
because reformers believed that only one broadcaster could use a frequency
band in a certain geographic area at a time. In fact, however, the concept of
technological interference was always a function of the limitations of transmitters and receivers and the consequence of the artificial constraints imposed by federal spectrum allocation and assignment policy.
1. Congressional Authorization
As explained in Part I above, the FCC today assumes that its role is
limited to addressing problems in spectrum assignment, administration, and
competition, without concern for the impact those decisions have on local
communities. Today, Congress rarely grants authority to the FCC (or most
agencies for that matter) that is as broad as the “public interest, convenience,
and necessity.”156 When Congress delegates regulatory responsibility today
under the Communications Act, it generally does so with much more articulated precision. In the early 1960s, for example, Congress granted to the
FCC the limited authority to develop a regulatory regime for cable television
based only on the broadly worded public interest mandate.157 In 1984 and
again in 1992, however, Congress narrowed the scope of the FCC’s authority, creating a formalized role for municipal governance of local cable
franchises.158
Similarly, Congress purposefully elaborated the FCC’s authority over
spectrum under the Communications Act in 1993, explicitly giving the
agency the limited authority to award licenses to use spectrum through competitive bidding.159 Congress concluded that “spectrum congestion” had
made it difficult for the agency to accommodate or promote new wireless
156.
The Court has not struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds since 1935,
which makes sense. After all, the modern administrative state would not function if Congress
could not delegate legislative functions to agencies or if the Court decided to adhere to a
narrow and formalist conception of delegation theory. See, e.g., American Power & Light Co.
v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); NBC v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assoc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001)
(discussing cases where the Court has not struck down a statue on nondelegation grounds).
Today, delegation analysis appears to have been subsumed under the Chevron analysis and
canons of statutory interpretation.
157.
United States v. Sw. Cable, 392 U.S. 157 (1968) (holding that an agency may regulate cable television because that medium is ancillary to broadcasting).
158.
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 541–42 (2012); see also id. § 332(c)(7)(A) (authorizing state and
local governments to make “decisions regarding the placement, construction, and modification
of personal wireless service facilities,” at the exclusion of the FCC in most circumstances).
159.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, § 6002, 107 Stat. 312;
47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(1). I do not discuss here the misadventure of random selection as a congressionally authorized method of assigning licenses. See id. § 309(i).
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technologies and services.160 Auctions, legislators believed, would distribute
licenses to service providers who would hasten the delivery of new services
to the public, make the most productive and efficient use of assigned frequencies, avoid rent-seeking by politically-connected applicants, and generate revenue for the Treasury.161
Under the 1993 law, Congress authorized the FCC to implement a competitive bidding process when mutually exclusive applicants seek to use the
same frequencies.162 Even for limited ranges of licenses, however, Congress
explicitly charged the FCC to attend to specific objectives, including the
development of new wireless technology and the promotion of economic
opportunity and competition.163 Here, Congress chose particularity over the
grab-bag “public interest” term of art with which regulators had become
cozy for decades.164
Recognizing that competitive bidding could lead to a significant increase in the market concentration of incumbent service providers, Congress
explicitly targeted small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by members of minority groups and women as potential licensees whose participation the FCC should especially facilitate and
encourage.165 Congress also commanded the FCC to design auctions in order to accommodate these groups.166 The auction provisions required the
FCC to promote “an equitable distribution of licenses among geographic
areas,” presumably obligating the agency to attend to local community contingencies.167 Congress authorized the FCC to do all of these things without
taking into account the revenues such auctions would generate for the Treasury.168 Congress concluded that some public interest priorities were far
more important than the size of the auction purse.
A few years later, Congress broadened the original auction authorization
to include flexible use technologies.169 Congress cabined this authority only
by warning that the Commission must first find that “such use is in the public interest, will not deter investment in telecommunications services and
technology, and will not produce harmful interference” before allocating
spectrum for flexible use.170
160.
H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 250 (1993) (Conf. Report).
161.
Id.; see also Thomas W. Hazlett et. al., What Really Matters in Spectrum Allocation
Design, 10 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 93 (2012).
162.
H.R. REP NO. 103-111, at 253-254 (1993) (Conf. Report).
163.
47 U.S.C. § 309 (j)(3)(A)-(B).
164.
See id. § 309 (j)(3).
165.
Id. § 309 (j)(3)(A)-(B); see also H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 254 (1993) (Conf.
Report).
166.
47 U.S.C. § 309 (j)(4)(A); id. § 309 (j)(4)(C)(ii).
167.
Id. § 309 (j)(4)(C)(i).
168.
Id. § 309 (j)(7).
169.
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub.L. No.105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
170.
H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 254 (1993) (Conf. Report).
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2. Spectrum Auctions Today
Almost two decades after the first legislative auction authorization, the
FCC has completed 93 auctions.171 They have generated billions of dollars
for the U.S. Treasury, lowered transaction costs for many stakeholders, and
brought broadband service to more people in more places than ever before.
Mobile wireless service is now central to the FCC’s agenda to promote
broadband infrastructure and innovation, accelerate universal broadband access and adoption, foster competition, and maximize consumer benefits.172
One of the more celebrated auctions occurred in 2007 and 2008 for the
coveted 700 MHz band formerly held by television broadcasters to transmit
their analog signal.173 That auction concluded with 1090 provisionally winning bids and generated almost $20 billion for the U.S. Treasury. AT&T
and Verizon, together with their subsidiaries, paid a combined $16.3 billion
for the most desired portions of the band and effectively won the right to
provide service around the country.174 The two companies have since committed to providing the most advanced mobile communication service networks for the next ten years.175
With each amendment to the Communications Act, and certainly with
the auction authorizations of the 1990s, Congress remade the administrative
regime it established almost seven decades before. The 1927 regime was
born from a political economy and technology in which the radio broadcaster was the public trustee gatekeeper. On the other hand, the contemporary 1993 competitive bidding regime is a creature of a political economy in
which broadcast stations, while still important, are no longer central or so
powerful. By the early 1990s, cable and satellite television service providers
posed a substantial competitive threat to broadcasters, undercutting daily
broadcast viewership by more than half.176
Today, broadcasters are no longer even the archetypal spectrum licensee: large telecommunications service providers are. Just consider the extraordinary amounts of money companies like AT&T and Verizon are
spending to acquire spectrum licenses by auction and in secondary markets.
The rapid commercial deployment of the Internet since the early to mid1990s has only further dislodged the centrality of broadcasting. Mobile
171.
Auctions Summary, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctions_all (last updated Aug. 12, 2013).
172.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 24.
173.
The broadcasters now transmit a digital signal through a different spectrum band.
174.
AT&T won the right to provide services in 176 “economic areas” and Verizon won
the right to provide wireless services in 734 “cellular market areas.” EAs are generally larger
than CMAs.
175.
Adam LaMore, The 700 MHz Band: Recent Developments and Future Plans, (Apr.
21, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse574-08/
ftp/700mhz/index.html.
176.
Cable: Then and Now (1992-2012), NAT’L CABLE AND TELECOMM. ASS’N, http://
www.ncta.com/statistic/statistic/Cable-Then-and-Now.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
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wireless broadband transmissions do not carry as much data as rapidly as
tactile wired transmission infrastructures like fiber optic cables do.177 But
the mobile wireless industry continues to grow apace, with consumer demand for mobile wireless service, devices, and applications growing
monthly.178 Consider that, after September 2013, Nielsen will change its
television viewership measurement system to include devices that deliver
broadband video streaming services such as Netflix and Amazon.179
Each successive amendment of the Communications Act has reflected
the fact that wireless communication service has matured into a specialized
regulatory field, requiring standards and objectives that are far more particularized than those in the original Communications Act. The auction provisions ought to be seen in this evolutionary light; they represent a significant
refinement and elaboration of agency discretion in spectrum policymaking.
On the one hand, they make no pretensions about the FCC’s role as the highminded steward of “social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences” that the Supreme Court described in 1943. On the other hand,
they have given the agency a free hand in designing competitive bidding
systems and promulgating related regulations.180
Under its general auction authority, the FCC today requires that firms
comply with generic laws and regulations regarding such things as equal
employment opportunities,181 signal interference,182 interference with spectrum under the jurisdiction of the Federal Aviation Administration,183 and
177.
See Eli Noam, Let Them Eat Cellphones: Why Mobile Wireless Is No Solution for
Broadband, 1 J. INFO. POL’Y 470 (2011).
178.
Phil Goldstein, Nielsen: Average U.S. Mobile Subscriber Uses 450 MB per Month,
FIERCEWIRELESS, (July 19, 2012), http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/nielsen-average-usmobile-subscriber-uses-450-mb-month/2012-07-19; see also BII Report: Why the ‘Second
Screen’ Industry Is Set to Explode, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/bii-report-why-the-second-screen-industry-is-set-to-explode-2013-2#ixzz2
KF0rkSAf.
179.
Alex Ben Block, Nielsen Agrees to Expand Definition of TV Viewing, HOLLYWOOD
REP. (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/nielsen-agrees-expand-definition-tv-422795.
180.
47 U.S.C. § 309 (j)(3)-(4) (2012).
181.
See, e.g., Factsheet for Auction 52: Direct Broadcast Satellite Service, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=52 (last
updated Aug. 30, 2006) (requiring that “DBS licensees are subject to Equal Employment Opportunity rules set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 25.601” in an auction for direct broadcast satellite
service).
182.
See, e.g., Factsheet for Auction 53: Multichannel Video Distribution & Data Service
(MVDDS), FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?jobauction_
factsheet&id=53 (last updated July 27, 2006) (requiring that “MVDDS systems may not cause
harmful interference to stations in Canada or Mexico” in an auction for multichannel video
programming distribution and data service).
183.
See, e.g., Factsheet for Auction 46: 1670-1675 MHz Band Nationwide License, FED.
COMM. COMMISSION, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id
=46 (last updated Aug. 30, 2006) (requiring that “Prior to construction of a station, a licensee
must register with the Commission any station antenna structure for which notification to the
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other technical requirements.184 These are routine and unproblematic requirements that apply in all agency actions bearing on spectrum. The
agency also has sought to ensure that each auction is free of collusion185 and
created payment mechanisms to accommodate smaller businesses as they bid
against larger, more capitalized wireless incumbents.186 This auction-byauction approach has allowed the agency to fashion auction processes on the
basis of the properties of the subject frequencies, the identity and number of
stakeholders affected, and the bidders’ commercial aspirations.187
D. Objectivity in Spectrum Administration
The account I have offered here illustrates that, with every incremental
legislative expansion of auction authority since 1993, the FCC has proceeded as though it has no substantial obligation to attend to anything other
than auction design. For the most part, the agency now treats as statutory
deadweight the requirements that affected local communities participate in
the licensing decision-making process and that it attend to local concerns
generally. To draw from an old analogy in this field, the FCC today is much
less the judgment-making spectrum traffic cop than a mechanical traffic
light, impassively assigning spectrum use rights to whomever posts the highest bid.
Today’s limits on the agency’s discretion recall those imposed on the
Commerce Department by courts before Congress enacted the 1927 Radio
Act. This is part of what is notable about today’s turn to competitive bidding, spectrum-as-property, and unlicensed use. Recall that, through the Radio Act, Congress explicitly sought to empower and expand agency
authority in ways that the courts had until then not permitted; Congress
passed that statute to give the agency more than just a ministerial licensing
role. But today, with competitive bidding, the FCC has returned to a regime
in which it attends to little more than technical interference and spectrum
band boundaries.
Federal Aviation Administration is required by Part 17” in an auction for the 1670-1675 MHz
band nationwide license).
184.
See, e.g., Factsheet for Auction 44: Lower 700 MHz Band, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=44 (Aug. 17,
2007) (requiring that “[p]artitioning and/or disaggregation is permitted” in an auction for the
lower 700 MHz Band).
185.
See, e.g., Star Wireless, LLC v. FCC, 522 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2008); High
Plains Wireless, L.P. v. FCC, 276 F.3d 599, 606-07 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
186.
See, e.g., Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 619 F.3d 235, 238 (3d Cir. 2010);
Sioux Valley Rural Television, Inc. v. FCC, 349 F.3d 667, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Celtronix
Telemetry, Inc. v. FCC, 272 F.3d 585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Fresno Mobile Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 165 F.3d 965, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Mountain Solutions, Ltd. v. FCC, 197 F.3d 512, 514
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
187.
See Gregory L. Rosston & Jeffrey S. Steinberg, Using Market-Based Spectrum Policy to Promote the Public Interest, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 104-06 (1997).
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Much of the specialized focus on technical interference is not the FCC’s
own doing. Amendments to the Communications Act over the past two decades have incrementally substituted the price mechanism for agency discretion: with each legislative elaboration of auction authority, Congress has
further entrenched the impression that the FCC may only administer its
charge under the Communications Act narrowly and under a limited set of
circumstances at the moment it designs the procedures for any given
auction.188
To the extent the FCC today has addressed nontechnical public interest
considerations through auction proceedings at all, it has done so to protect
competition in the wireless broadband service provider market.189 For example, the agency imposed conditions on large incumbent service providers to
which it awarded coveted spectrum bands. Under the terms of the auctioned
licenses, AT&T and Verizon generally must now make their networks available to the devices and applications of unaffiliated (and generally smaller)
competitors.190 Much more recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit affirmed an FCC rule that imposed obligations on those same two
providers to make their networks available to competitors for “data roaming” on a “commercially reasonable” basis.191 These regulations expand carriers’ previous obligation to offer roaming agreements to other carriers for
simply mobile voice service.192 The newest FCC rules impose similar obligations on mobile data providers, assuring that subscribers of smaller carri-

188.
See 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3) (2012) (“For each class of licenses or permits that the
Commission grants through the use of a competitive bidding system, the Commission shall, by
regulation, establish a competitive bidding methodology.”).
189.
See, e.g., Promoting Interoperability in the 700 Mhz Commercial Spectrum, 27 FCC
Rcd. 3521 (2012); Service Rules for the 698–806 MHz Band, Revision of the Commission’s
Rules Regarding Public Safety Spectrum Requirements, and a Declaratory Ruling on Reporting Requirement under the Commission’s Anti-Collusion Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 48,814, 48,818
(Aug. 24, 2007) (“Open Platforms for Devices and Applications”); see also Crawford, supra
note 92, at 995-99; Tim Wu, Wireless Carterfone, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 389 (2007). These competition-bearing obligations are distinct from the common carrier obligations that the FCC imposes on wireless voice service and other “commercial mobile services.” See 47 U.S.C.
§§ 332(c)(2), 332(d)(3). It is worth nothing here that the Federal Trade Commission has entered into consent decrees with smartphone and tablet manufacturers over privacy and security
concerns. See, e.g., HTC America Inc., 2013 WL 3477025, at *8 (F.T.C. June 25, 2013); see
also Mobile App Developers: Start with Security, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Feb. 2013), http://
business.ftc.gov/documents/bus83-mobile-app-developers-start-security.
190.
The FCC arguably imposed conditions on the winning bids because of the relative
influence of a single high-profile reserve bid by Google. See Sandro Brusco et al. The ‘Google
Effect’ in the FCC’s 700 MHz Auction, 21 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 101, 112-13 (2009).
191.
Cellco P’ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 538 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reviewing on appeal
Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Providers & Other
Providers of Mobile Data Servs., 26 FCC Rcd. 5411 (2011)).
192.
See Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Serv.
Providers & Other Providers of Mobile Data Servs., 25 FCC Rcd. 4181, 4190-4201 (2010).
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ers remain connected to the Internet when traveling outside of their home
networks.193
These two actions illustrate the important but narrow set of competitionrelated public interest obligations that the FCC has imposed on carriers in
the auction era. The FCC has done little else to incorporate other public
interest concerns in the competitive bidding process. It certainly has done
little to assure the “best practicable service” to local communities or to incorporate local public participation in spectrum use decisions.194 Of note,
during the past decade, the agency opened inquiries into low power broadcast radio use, as well as local public interest programming and related obligations.195 However, these efforts fizzled. In the auction era, the
Commission has simply chosen to turn its attention to such considerations as
it sees fit—which, as it turns out, is a rare occurrence.196
There are recent glimmers of hope, however. In its recent effort to clear
by incentive auction the spectrum band currently used exclusively by overthe-air broadcasters, the agency is considering the possibility of prioritizing
low power television stations if they would be “the only local, over-the-air
television service” in the community.197 Of course, it is not much trouble for
the agency to have the small slice of spectrum that already supports overthe-air broadcasting continue doing so. However, this particular policymaking effort bespeaks the agency’s recognition that federal spectrum administration ought to consider “the information needs of local communities.”198
The real challenge is in implementing that concern systematically.
Part Three below takes up this challenge. There, I consider omissions in
current federal spectrum administration as an invitation to recommend ways
in which local communities might bring their priorities to spectrum administration through extant processes in public law administration. Again, this
193.
Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Serv. Providers & Other Providers of Mobile Data Servs., 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, 5411 (2011).
194.
Cf. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
195.
See Broad. Localism, 19 FCC Rcd. 12425 (2004); Creation of Low Power Radio
Service, 15 FCC Rcd. 2205 (2000); Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Chairman
Powell Launches “Localism in Broadcasting” Initiative (Aug. 20, 2003), http://hraunfoss.fcc.
gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-238057A1.pdf.
196.
Some of this is not the agency’s own doing. There is very little it can do, for example, to establish race- or gender-based “preferences” in auction design pursuant to Supreme
Court precedent. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995); see also
Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that FCC’s decision
to remove advantages for women and racial minorities in competitive bidding process is
neither arbitrary nor capricious).
197.
Incentive Auctions NPRM, supra note 5, at 12476.
198.
Waldman, supra note 154; see Incentive Auctions NPRM, supra note 5 at 12362. In
the same notice, the agency does throughout recognize the pertinence of geographic contingency, but mostly as a matter of engineering. For example, it also invited comment on a “use it
or share it” policy that would permit third parties to make use of unused spectrum on a localized basis until a licensee begins providing service in those areas. See id. at 12490-91.
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contrasts the arguments made by scholars about the new orthodoxy that, I
argue, distort our understanding of public lawmaking through their focus on
the objective efficiency of the new technologies.
III. SPECTRUM TECHNOLOGY

FOR

LIVING COMMUNITIES

Proposals for unlicensed use owe something to the more general claims
about the liberating possibilities of networked computing and communications. In the late 1990s, prominent legal scholars argued that the technological design of the Internet determines online behavior as much if not more
than social norms, the market, or government-promulgated law.199 The
choices that users make when they are online, they argued, are defined
above all by the computer code on which any site or application is based. In
this regard, software code and technological design are the most effective
regulators of online behavior, functioning as a Lex Informatica.200 Accordingly, they concluded, it is incumbent on legislators and policymakers to
develop flexible and context-specific regulatory regimes that accommodate
new services and technologies.201
This argument has a lot of merit. After all, scholars have long pondered
about the unidirectional relationship between technological change and government regulation, well before the advent of networked computing and
communications.202 By the end of the 1990s, the Internet already had upended the political economy of the distribution of at least news and music
and emerged as an unprecedented platform for communication and information sharing, undeterred by extant laws against unlicensed distribution of
proprietary content. “Cyberspace,” as one writer brashly put it, is a place
where traditional “legal concepts of property, expression, identity, movement, and context do not apply.”203 For example, emergent Internet-based
peer-to-peer file-sharing applications were notoriously indifferent to statutory protections for copyrighted works.204 They naturalized behavior that
was otherwise forbidden by law.
In the tumultuous environment of fifteen years ago, it was not hard to
imagine that, if the Internet could unsettle the legal protections to which the
199.
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 501, 509-11, 521-22, 530-31 (1999).
200.
See Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998).
201.
Lessig, supra note 199, at 513-14, 533; Reidenberg, supra note 200.
202.
See, e.g., WILLIAM F. OGBURN, ON CULTURE AND SOCIAL CHANGE: SELECTED PAPERS 30–31 (1964).
203.
JOHN PERRY BARLOW, DECLARATION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF CYBERSPACE (Feb 8,
1996), available at https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html.
204.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 175 (2006). Policymakers took these recommendations for reform seriously enough to incorporate them in laws governing intellectual
property enforcement. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012); see also Gideon Parchomovsky
& Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 117-18 (2010).
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publishing, music, and film industries were long entitled, contemporaneous
innovations in smart spectrum sharing technology could do the same to FCC
command-and-control licensing. Indeed, for unlicensed use advocates in
particular, the growth of networked computing is of a piece with the new
smart spectrum sharing technologies.205
As with the code-as-law argument, however, the new orthodoxy is
weakest when it is premised on the idea that the mere existence of the new
technology ought to direct reform. The prevailing view is that policymakers
will have done essentially all they ought once they just start allowing service
providers, device manufacturers, and consumers to use the new spectrum
sharing technologies, unimpeded by inflexible government mandates.206
Scholars anticipate that service providers and wireless devices in a liberated
regulatory environment will actualize real consumer demand and maximize
social efficiency.207 Under the prevailing view, the FCC and the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) would have a
very limited role; they would facilitate mobile wireless broadband adoption
by prohibiting harmful technological interference standards (under the unlicensed use approach), or defining and enforcing clear property rights (under
the spectrum-as-property approach), or just getting out of the way.
To be sure, public law promulgated by the FCC is important because it
can help redress technical resource administration problems like frequency
scarcity and interference. It also can facilitate innovation through the clear
articulation of property rights. But these proposals are incomplete for two
main reasons. First, they ascribe too much power to the new technologies.
These proposals recognize that the design of networked communication
technologies is value-laden (i.e., not neutral) and, for that reason, has important implications for policy and politics.208 But they understate the extent to
which the process of integrating spectrum administration technologies in
public life is indeterminate and contested. They seem to overlook that new
technologies, as with all technologies, are put to varying and sometimes conflicting purposes by people and institutions in real places with a particular
permutation of demographic, environmental, and commercial interests.209
205.
See BENKLER, supra note 53, at 87-89, 153-54. Cf. Kevin Werbach, Castle in the
Air: A Domain Name System for Spectrum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 613, 631 (2009) (arguing that
spectrum administration should be styled after ICANN’s administration of assigned IP
numbers).
206.
See, e.g., Hazlett & Leo, supra note 3, at 1069-72 (discussing how spectrum sharing
or “overlay” technology will effectively “cede the task of spectrum reallocation to markets”).
207.
Id. at 1053 (quoting Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2
J.L. & ECON. 1, 27 (1959)).
208.
See BENKLER, supra note 53; see also CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY:
THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2009).
209.
See, e.g., John Markoff & Nicole Perlroth, Firm Is Accused of Sending Spam, and
Fight Jams the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, at A1.
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Second, the new orthodoxy neglects no less than the constructive purpose of public lawmaking in democracy—that is, it overlooks that public
lawmaking processes bring disparate groups and interests together in order
to authentic the ultimate substantive policy choice as publicly vetted and
collectively joined.210 My argument here does not require that we return to
the midcentury dark ages of federal spectrum administration. Congress and
FCC today need not replicate the local comparative hearing, particularly in
light of its history of corruption and rent-seeking. That Congress and the
FCC accommodated local community participation in the past is suggestive,
but not dispositive of its importance. As I show in Part Two above, Congress
embedded local community participation in federal spectrum administration
in order to integrate the complex technologies of the day into public life.
This is an ambition for public lawmaking that ought to remain constant for
all time, well after the smartphones of today give way to the next best thing.
The analogy to roads and highways, a common rhetorical move for
scholars in this area since the 1920s,211 is useful to elaborate the point. Advocates of unlicensed use argue that exclusive licensing in spectrum assignment (whether by command-and-control licensing or under a spectrum-asproperty system) is akin to designating certain lanes or highways for certain
uses, no matter the number of people want to travel in a vehicle or the size of
vehicles or the purposes for any given person’s travel. Removing all such
restrictions would allow the roads to be more effectively used, with different
drivers taking routes on the basis of their own best guess about how to get to
their destination at any given day under any circumstances.212 Unrestricted
highway access also gives automobile manufacturers the incentive to innovate with different sizes and designs to accommodate different needs and
interests, insofar as they also abide by public safety concerns.
210.
Cf. Peter M. Shane, Cybersecurity Policy as if “Ordinary Citizens” Mattered: The
Case for Public Participation in Cyber Policy Making, 8 J.L. & POL’Y INFO. FOR SOC’Y 433,
439-40 (2012) (”Given the ubiquity of computer networks and our reliance as a society on
their integrity and robustness, the quality of cybersecurity is an issue that affects everyone’s
interests. Excluding the general public from any meaningful voice in cyber policymaking
removes citizens from democratic governance in an area where our welfare is deeply implicated.”) (emphasis added); Olivier Sylvain, Internet Governance and Democratic Legitimacy,
62 FED. COMM. L.J. 205, 209-10 (2008) (“communications is one policy area that should
always be legitimated one way or another by public processes and not subject to ad hoc liberal
deference to nongovernmental self-regulatory organizations. Indeed, as a historical matter,
policymakers have implemented public-regarding models particularly because of communications’ unique public role.).
211.
Compare BENKLER, supra note 53, at 88, with Herbert Hoover, Sec’y of Commerce,
Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and Recommendations for Regulation of
Radio, (November 9-11, 1925), at 1, 9-10, available at earlyradiohistory.us/1925conf.htm
(“We can no longer deal on the basis that there is room for everybody on the radio highways.
There are more vehicles on the roads than can get by, and if they continue to jam in all will be
stopped.”).
212.
See, e.g., BENKLER, supra note 53, at 88.
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Advocates for spectrum-as-property, on the other hand, argue that spectrum could be regulated like roads only if smart sharing technologies truly
make spectrum frequencies non-excludable and non-rivalrous in a way that
makes free-riding and the private provision of the service unlikely.213 But
the analogy to roads is inapt, they argue, because, under the current state of
the technology, interference and free-riding continue to be a problem, even
under unlicensed use.214
The approach I advocate here would recognize that our highways and
their use are highly regulated and monitored to ensure car safety and traffic
flow. Federal, state, and local agencies are deeply involved in making regulatory decisions about roads, no matter the improved quality of highway
construction material or advances in public safety technologies.215 Transportation infrastructure is rich with problems that are classically assigned to
legislatures and rulemaking agencies because of their broad, polycentric
character—the very attributes that make roads a public good in the classical
economic sense.
But beyond this, local communities participate in transportation infrastructure planning because of its demographic, environmental, and commercial impact on the communities it serves and through which it passes, no
matter the developments in the technologies for global positioning systems
or robotics. Indeed, in most places around the world, transportation infrastructure design is as much an endeavor in civic identity formation as are
public safety regulation and utilitarian traffic management. Sustainable
transportation infrastructure design must adapt to idiosyncratic local considerations, including neighborhood contiguity, the physical integrity of shared
spaces, population density, topology, safety, environmental justice, and economic development.216
Current proposals for spectrum administration reform release the FCC
from the obligation to consider analogous local contingencies in the context
of spectrum infrastructure design and use. Under a pure property rights regime, those decisions would be made by spectrum brokers—buyers and sellers—who owe no duty to local communities as a matter of course. Pursuant
to auction, exclusive licenses can be national or just regional in scope, but
the underlying assumption is that, for all awarded through auction at least,
the unobstructed price mechanism provides the most reliable signal about
213.
See Hazlett & Leo, supra note 3, at 1082-85.
214.
Id.
215.
See, e.g., Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard, Rearview Mirrors; Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard, Low-Speed Vehicles Phase-In Reporting Requirements, 75 Fed. Reg.
76,185 (proposed Dec. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 571 & 585).
216.
See Susan Hanson, The Context of Urban Travel: Concepts and Recent Trends, in
THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN TRANSPORTATION 12-19 (Susan Hanson & Genevieve Giuliano
eds., 3d ed. 2004). See generally JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN
CITIES 14, 428-48 (1961) (arguing that city planning must attend to the “intricate and closegrained diversity of uses”); id. at 428-48 (discussing the complexities of city planning).
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how or whether buyers or producers should adjust their services and devices
in real time.217 In turn, property rules are presumed to be the remedy for
spectrum underuse and overuse; they are the ostensible antidote for inefficiency.218 As such, the spectrum-as-property approach returns us to the era
before Congress passed the 1927 Radio Act or the 1934 Communications
Act (or, for that matter, the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act) when there
was no formalized administrative mechanisms other than the operation of
property law that mediated the acquisition and assignment of licenses in the
secondary market, let alone accommodated local public participation.219
Similarly, under an unlicensed use regime, standard-setting organizations (perhaps in collaboration with the FCC) would in the first instance set
the rules governing spectrum use.220 At least theoretically, these rules would
depend largely on the consensus view among nongovernmental stakeholders
about how sophisticated the devices ought to be and the purposes to which
devices would be put. But, again, the standard would be sealed away from
the conventional public lawmaking processes. Nothing would require that
they do anything more as a matter of course.
In this Part, I attempt to rectify this failure. First, I sketch the normative
basis for public accountability of agency action by citation to foundational
administrative law theory and doctrine, at a minimum to underscore that
Congress and the courts have a rich vocabulary for articulating when a regulatory regime or discrete agency action is inadequately attentive to public
participation or accountability. This section is not a thorough accounting of
the lawfulness of FCC spectrum auctions under administrative law as much
as a review of the places in the doctrine where some of these tensions lie.
This analysis sets up a more assertive argument for incorporating contemporary norms and trends in administrative law governance today—
namely, local participation in federal policymaking. As there is not the
slightest recognition of this inattention in current reform proposals, Part
III.B begins the work of imagining a formal structure for federal spectrum
administration that accommodates local community participation in the first
instance. This Part serves as an outline of the more ambitious project about
how best to orient wireless administration towards the priorities of local
communities. Municipal governments, I speculate, might be best suited to
filling the gap. This Part does not recommend an exhaustive or definitive
regulatory arrangement or process, but only the outlines of what such an
arrangement should entail. It shows that the work that municipalities already
217.
Cf. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519
(1945).
218.
Hazlett & Leo, supra note 3, at 1053 (citing Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968)); id. at 1066 (quoting CHARLES WOLF, JR., MARKETS OR
GOVERNMENTS: CHOOSING BETWEEN IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 57 (1988)).
219.
See supra Part II.A.
220.
See PCAST Report, supra note 15, at 15, 24.
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are doing to facilitate the provision of broadband network service to their
residents suggests an institutional competence that should be integrated into
federal spectrum administration reform as a matter of course.
A. Public Participation in Federal Spectrum Administration
Current proposals for federal spectrum administration reform flout, or at
least are in tension with, basic tenets and norms in administrative law doctrine, including public accountability, reason-giving, and nondelegation.
This section below briefly identifies some of these tensions and sets the
stage for a more elaborate discussion in Part III.B below.
1. Public Accountability
The courts are precluded from questioning “the fine utilitarian calculus”
generally reserved for the political branches, particularly on the finest policy
problems that Congress delegates to agencies.221 Even the Supreme Court
has explained that it is not “qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to agencies.”222 The
basic idea is that, in the absence of a clear legislative command, independent
agencies like the FCC ought to be able to bring to bear their unique expertise
and institutional competence to accomplish objectives set out by Congress,
without worrying about political ramifications or that a court will invalidate
an action on substantive grounds.223 Independent agencies like the FCC are
expected to do their work relatively free from politics or even the heavyhanded influence of the President.224
The auction authorization under the Communications Act seems to
square easily with this conception. Congress granted the FCC wide discretion to design the processes through which spectrum bands are licensed to
auction bidders.225 The same is true for the agency’s authority to carve out
spectrum bands for unlicensed use since there is nothing in the Communications Act that prohibits the agency from doing so. The President and the
FCC have explicitly observed that the agency should explore unlicensed use
regimes in their effort to make available 500 megahertz of frequency for
221.
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978).
222.
Whitman v. American Trucking Assocs., 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (citing Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989)); see also Industrial Union Dept. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (among the “three important
functions” of the nondelegation doctrine is to “ensure to the extent consistent with orderly
governmental administration that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the
branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will.”).
223.
See FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (the 1934 Communications Act is a “supple instrument for the exercise of discretion by the expert body
which Congress has charged to carry out its legislative policy.”).
224.
See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 523, 540 (2009) (“The
independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President.”).
225.
See 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3) (2012).
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commercial mobile and fixed wireless broadband use by 2020.226 Courts will
likely defer to the agency’s decision to clear spectrum bands for unlicensed
use in furtherance of this stated policy objective,227 particularly as the FCC
has for decades now allocated spectrum bands for unlicensed use without
controversy.228
These deference norms, however, operate alongside a structure under
the Administrative Procedure Act that explicitly provides for the participation of “interested persons” of the public in agency deliberations, including
rulemakings.229 Congress passed the APA in order to keep the public apprised of agency action, provide the public an opportunity to participate in
the rulemaking process, and standardize administrative practice (including
public participation) among the diverse agencies.230 Even in legislative
fields for which agency expertise is at a premium, Congress decided that
agency action generally must be held accountable to the public, even if legislators did not impose on agencies “the full panoply of procedural devices.”231 Congress ensured instead that the public has a minimum of
information about agency organization and rules.232 Of course, when Congress passed the APA in 1946, it did not anticipate the important role that
other methods of controlling administrative action (namely executive, legislative, and internal supervision) would have in the decades that followed the
APA’s passage.233 But there can be little doubt that the participation of the
public in rulemakings has always been considered essential.234 The chief
question among scholars has been whether this accountability is best
achieved through accountability to the political branches or the rigorous judicial enforcement of administrative procedures.235
226.
See FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, supra note 24, at 83; Memorandum from President
Barack Obama: Unleashing the Wireless Broadband Revolution, supra note 22.
227.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. of the U.S.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
228.
See supra notes Part I.B.
229.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
230.
See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1947).
231.
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 544-48 (1978).
Nor are courts permitted to impose any more than what the APA and the respective enabling
statute require. Id. at 524.
232.
Id. at 524.
233.
See Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and the Deference
Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763 (2012); Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative
Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 101 (2003); see also Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the
Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124
HARV. L. REV. 994 (2011).
234.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
235.
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1749, 1766-67 (2007).
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2. Reason-Giving
Congress further underscored the importance of public participation by
imposing on agencies the obligation to justify their actions with reasons.
Agencies must describe “the terms or substance” or “the subjects and issues”
regarding the subject matter of a proposed rule.236 They also must provide a
“concise general statement” supporting any final new rule.237 The Court has
also explained that agency actions must be guided by statutory authority and
subject matter expertise in order to afford members of the public the opportunity to understand and, if necessary, challenge discrete agency actions.238
These guidelines provide courts with the standards by which to scrutinize
those actions. The standards for agency adjudications (and licensing) are
even higher.239
These requirements suggest that regulators’ decisions cannot be insulated from the scrutiny of public reason. Indeed, the failure to publish the
reasons for an action to the public exposes that action to remand, reversal, or
vacatur by a court.240 Even while the standard of judicial review of rules is
generally understood to be quite deferential to agencies,241 courts also must
ensure that agencies take into account the “relevant factors” of the subject
legislative field and are not arbitrary.242 The FCC subjects spectrum auctions
to public scrutiny to the extent it affords opportunity for comment on auction
design, publishes the names of the bidders, the bid amounts, and the eventual
winners.243
As rationalized as this process is, however, the FCC does not render
substantive decisions about which individual bidders should receive a license by engaging in the kind of agency reason-giving as suggested by the
APA. Rather, the award of licenses is a function of the design of the auction
and the market pressures that influence bids—it is not the subject of agency
judgment, as Congress appears to have meant under the reason-giving provisions of the APA. As I explain above, reformers in the 1990s sought to
incorporate auctions in the licensing process in order to ensure that licenses
went to applicants who valued the subject frequencies most. At a minimum,
236.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3).
237.
See id. § 553(c).
238.
See SEC v. Chenery, 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see also SEC v. Chenery, 318 U.S. 80
(1943).
239.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557; see also id. § 551(6) (defining agency orders, the
final disposition of an adjudication, to include licensing).
240.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp.,
568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (vacating agency rule for failure to adequately “ventilate” the
underlying major issues of policy).
241.
See, e.g., Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
242.
5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
243.
See supra Part II.C.
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however, the auction regime does not jive perfectly with a statutory scheme
that requires agencies to employ their reasoned judgment, rather than the
price mechanism that guides the outcome of auctions.
3. Nondelegation
Another foundational principle in administrative law counsels against
insulating agency decision-making in ways that the new orthodoxy suggests.
Consider some of the recent scholarship on nondelegation. As marginalized
as that constitutional rule has been in the courts over the past several decades, it has retained an important place in legal scholarship.244 Scholars
have argued that the nondelegation doctrine allows legislatures to distribute
rights without imposing proportionate duties. For example, Congress can
take political credit for enacting a law that will clean the air, but, through
delegation to agencies, it can avoid the political costs of actually implementing restrictions on polluters or increasing prices for consumers.245 In this
way, Congress routinely defers the harder task of defining and imposing
affirmative duties to agencies. This is arguably a constitutionally dubious
practice “when the lawmakers we elect have others make the law.”246 In this
vein, Congress’s decision to authorize the FCC to administer spectrum auctions or make unlicensed use regimes available releases it from the political
costs of doing so directly.
But the argument that legislatures should internalize costs to assure political accountability is only persuasive to the extent the costs of public participation at the agency level are higher than the costs of lobbying
legislators. Under the APA or under formal agency-specific rulemaking regulations, public participation at the agency level is not as costly. Administrative agencies generally are quite accessible to public participation through
notice and comment proceedings, for example.247 Today, members of the
public may also now submit comments online in response to an agency notice of proposed rulemaking or initiate a petition through the “We the People” website to have the White House respond to question or request for
action.248 In the context of auctions, for example, members of the public
244.
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315
(2000) (arguing that, while the Court has not relied on the nondelegation doctrine to strike
down an act of Congress since 1935, the doctrine “is alive and well” through “a series of more
specific and smaller, though quite important, nondelegation doctrines.”); see also Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003);
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003).
245.
DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY 183-84 (1993).
246.
Id.
247.
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c).
248.
See Send Us Your Comments, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/comments (last visited Aug. 18, 2013); We the People: Your Voice in Our Government, THE
WHITE HOUSE, https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2013); see also Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government from Barack Obama, President of the United
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may petition to modify the auction process for any given spectrum band and
seek conditions on licensees.249 For a variety of reasons, the costs of gaining
lawful access to members of Congress or their staffs are in fact far higher
than those for gaining access to agency officials.250 In short, the structure of
the administrative state today makes it difficult for legislatures to pass the
buck to agencies, even in the context of the FCC’s administration of
spectrum.
4. Balancing Accountability, Independence, and Flexibility
Historically, scholars of the administrative state have conceived of agencies as specialized forums in which impassive expertise ought to prevail over
public opinion or political fiat.251 “Bureaucracy,” Woodrow Wilson wrote,
“can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the
common political life of the people, its chief as well as its rank and file. Its
motives, its objects, its policy, its standards, must be bureaucratic.”252
The Court has ratified the view that agencies should be sealed off from
undue intrusion in agency work. For example, they have warned against undue legislative meddling with agency authority to execute or implement
law.253 The idea here is that, through presentment under Article One of the
Constitution, the President stands as a legitimate spokesperson for a “national perspective” that would otherwise be neglected by the more parochial
interests of members of Congress.254
The courts also have argued for limited judicial intrusion on agency
work, even when they are asked to review substantive agency action.255 In
those cases, the Supreme Court has observed that, to the extent the pertinent
statutory authorities are ambiguous, courts should defer to executive agencies’ interpretations because the latter actually have some structural relationship to electoral politics.256 In this conception, judges have no
constituency.257 When an agency radically alters an essential characteristic
States of America, for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685
(Jan. 21, 2009).
249.
See Brusco et al., supra note 190, at 2.
250.
Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1958-59 (2008).
251.
Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of
New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399 (2007); Wilson, supra note 128.
252.
Wilson, supra note 128, at 217.
253.
See, e.g., INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947-48 (1983).
254.
Id. at 948 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 123 (1926)).
255.
See, e.g., Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
256.
Id. at 865-866 (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”).
257.
Id. at 866.
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of a regulatory regime or promulgates a policy of enormous economic and
political significance because the governing statute is ambiguous, however,
courts will be more skeptical.258
Administrative law doctrine offers more than just these platitudes, however. In a line of scholarship that has clear implications for spectrum-asproperty and unlicensed use regimes generally, scholars have identified
privatization of agency action as coming dangerously close to undermining
the important role of democratic accountability in public lawmaking.259
Scholars writing in this field recognize that, on the one hand, privatization
might actually be an effective way of furthering public objectives and improving government functioning.260 Yet countervailing norms and interests
counsel for preserving “constitutional accountability without sacrificing governmental regulatory flexibility and its associated benefits.”261
B. Localism in Federal Spectrum Administration
Even with these few examples, the section above illustrates that administrative law doctrine provides ample guidance to policymakers and scholars
and highlights the neglect of the new orthodoxy. But these traditional doctrinal considerations are abstractions. Contemporary trends in administrative
law that policymakers are employing on the ground, day-to-day provide
even more support for a nuanced, public-centered approach to federal spectrum administration. Recent cooperative efforts between federal and local
governments, particularly in broadband law and policymaking, illustrate
how the prevailing spectrum-as-property and unlicensed use approaches fall
short.262
258.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160-61 (2000); MCI v
AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist dissenting) (“A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.”).
259.
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 244, at 1290-91; Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing
Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very Public Power to Private, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations, 56 AMER. U. L. REV. 455 (2007); Metzger, supra note 244, at 1408.
260.
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 244, at 1285; Metzger, supra note 244, at 1470.
261.
Metzger, supra note 244, at 1408. Jody Freeman in particular has proposed three
considerations that generally recommend more disclosure and public participation when agencies have delegated substantive decision-making responsibilities to private entities: “(1) the
relative precision with which a service can be specified and the extent of the provider’s discretion, (2) the potential impact on the consumer, and (3) the government’s motivation for privatization.” Freeman, supra note 244, at 1291. Freeman’s formulation is flexible enough to
accommodate all manner of regulatory structure, depending on the unique tradeoffs of the
particular subject matter. And, indeed, it provides a very useful frame through which policymakers at the FCC and scholars generally can bring to their thinking about the pertinence of
public participation in the spectrum-as-property and unlicensed use approaches to federal spectrum administration. See also Shane, supra note 210, at 441-42 (arguing for more citizen engagement in cyber security policymaking).
262.
See Sylvain, supra note 6, at 805-09.
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To be fair, as I assert above, some scholars have acknowledged that the
administration of unlicensed spectrum use must attend as a substantive matter to the local conditions that affect use in any given area. For example,
Weiser and Hatfield recommend that the FCC enlist volunteers from local
communities to act as de facto enforcement deputies who patrol for willful
or malicious interference.263 Buck recommends the establishment of “localized spectrum management groups” comprised of service providers and consumer groups that, among other things, would modify agency rules
according to local contingencies.264 He recognizes, for example, that a geographically neutral approach to spectrum allocation (for example, between
spectrum bands reserved for forestry communications and those for taxicab
communications) or power restrictions applied to all localities irrespective of
population density is an ineffective way of administering spectrum.265
Neither of these proposals explains how local conditions would be incorporated formally in federal spectrum administration, however. These proposals are silent on the substantive scope of the local groups’ discretion and
authority, the potential impact their decisions have on spectrum users, and
the very reason to delegate that responsibility to any particular nongovernmental group or body. More generally, they do not explain how local volunteers or group members would be chosen, how often they would convene, or
how their decisions would be incorporated formally in FCC decision-making
and actions. The proposals are silent on such considerations because they
conceive of the collection of information about local conditions as incidental
to servicing the technical administration of spectrum. They assume that information about local conditions is a substantive instrumental input for the
development of device interference standards.
To contrast, I argue that local public participation is important because it
provides the best-articulated evidence of local conditions. Local governments are best suited to appreciating the unique characteristics that distinguish their region and constituents from others.266 Models for such an
approach already exist in communications law in the context of local cable
franchise authorities and state utility commissions.267 Other regimes under
the Communications Act call on local and state agencies to certify that a
provider complies with certain background state or federal requirements.268
These institutional arrangements abound in other legislative areas as well.
263.
Weiser & Hatfield, supra note 52, at 693 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 101 (2004) rules on
dispute resolution between licensed users of spectrum).
264.
Buck, supra note 4, ¶¶ 53, 57-62.
265.
Id. ¶ 53 (citing Lawrence J. White, “Propertyzing” the Electromagnetic Spectrum:
Why It’s Important, and How to Begin, 9 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 19, 25-26 (2000)).
266.
See Sylvain, supra note 6, at 805 (citing, inter alia, JAMES E. WILSON, TERROIR:
THE ROLE OF GEOLOGY, CLIMATE, AND CULTURE IN THE MAKING OF FRENCH WINES (1999)).
267.
See id. at 823-31 (discussing provisions in the amended Communications Act).
268.
See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 51.318(b)(1) (2013) (requiring state certification that local
telecommunications carrier provides local voice service in the area); id. § 54.404 (stating that
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They are manifest in the Environmental Protection Agency’s regulation of
air and water pollution control and pesticides,269 as well as in federal grant
programs.270 Moreover, the Department of Transportation authorizes state
agencies to establish occupancy requirements of vehicles operating in high
occupancy vehicle lanes.271
These existing regulatory schemes suggest an alternative to the new orthodoxy in federal spectrum administration to the extent they accommodate
local and state government participation. While we might have valid concerns about whether municipalities are the best “spokesentities” for their
constituent residents,272 at a minimum, they demonstrate an acknowledgement among legislators that local communities can play an important, if not
determinative, role in public law administration through certifications or the
like. There is no such recognition in current debates about reforms to current
federal spectrum administration.
But we can say even more about the role of municipal governments,
particularly as local broadband infrastructure continues to grow into a key
asset in the Internet’s maturation.273 Internet experiences today are determined largely by the physical transmission equipment, towers, and technologies situated in local communities. Accordingly, as consumers demand more
Internet content and services, incumbent broadband providers, major Internet stakeholders, and municipal governments are investing heavily in local ultra high-speed, high-capacity infrastructure.274
Local governments are initiating efforts to build-out broadband infrastructure for their residents.275 These efforts should come as no surprise.276
Municipalities are generally best situated to discover and resolve residents’
problems, are familiar with local conditions and priorities, and serve as an
state certification allows local telecommunications carriers to waive federal requirements regarding the National Lifeline Accountability Database).
269.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 20.3, 20.6, 20.8 (2013); id. §§ 171.7-171.8; id. § 761.61; see
also NRDC v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2002).
270.
See Indian Environmental General Assistance Program Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4368 (b) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 35.1620-2 (detailing application contents for Clean Lakes Assistance Program grants).
271.
See 23 U.S.C. § 166 (2012).
272.
I am grateful to Peter M. Shane for this term and idea. See generally Shane, supra
note 210, at 453-58 (discussing models for collaboration and consensus-building among experts and laypeople vis-à-vis cyber policy).
273.
Sylvain, supra note 6, at 798.
274.
High profile projects like Google’s project to build a model ultra-high-speed broadband network in Kansas City, Missouri, the free wireless network that covers about half of
Decatur, Georgia, and the highly regarded mixed wireless-and-wired network in the Chattanooga, Tennessee are illustrative of the these recent efforts, most of which involve privatepublic partnerships to build local infrastructure.
275.
As of February 2013, 342 local governments have invested in wired telecommunications networks. See Community Network Map, COMMUNITY BROADBAND NETWORKS, http://
muninetworks.org/communitymap.
276.
Sylvain, supra note 6, at 805-09.
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indispensible hub where major anchor institutions, civic groups, and individuals convene.277
The trend today is to remove barriers to local participation in infrastructure development. In the past few years, Congress and the FCC have developed strategies to encourage private and public investment in local
broadband networks.278 For example, Congress created an agency-administered grant-making program through the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to support the build-out of “middle-mile” and “last-mile”
broadband networks. It is now also considering grant-making programs that
would support broadband wiring along roads and mandates for equipping
federal public buildings with wireless service.279
For its part, the FCC has launched a series of initiatives aimed at
partnering with local governments to accelerate broadband adoption and service for underserved communities,280 improving subsidy programs for public
libraries, schools, and high-cost service areas, and updating the rules governing utility poles, rights-of-way, collocation, and the siting of wireless antennas and towers.281 The Commission also will lead an effort among federal
agencies to increase broadband speeds and alleviate Wi-Fi congestion at
large quasi-public spaces like airports and convention centers.282 All of these
efforts benefit from active local municipal participation. Such projects
would not succeed without the unique institutional competence that municipal governments bring to any infrastructure project.
There is another direct and structurally sustainable way in federal spectrum administration to engage local governments and groups in the effort to
accelerate broadband adoption and service. As with their federal counterparts, local government agencies have at their disposal their own federally
277.
William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional
Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 92–94 (1999)); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Sitting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 296 (2011); Sylvain, supra
note 6, at 823 (citing Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 384–87, 384 n.35 (2005)).
278.
See Press Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, Statement from FCC Chairman Julius
Genachowski on Proposed Municipal Broadband Legislation (Feb. 15, 2013), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2013/db0215/DOC-318975A1.pdf.
279.
See Federal Wi-Net Act, S. 3439, 112th Cong. (2012); Broadband Conduit Deployment Act of 2011, H.R. 1695, 112th Cong. § 330(a) (2011).
280.
See About Us, CONNECT2COMPETE, http://www.connect2compete.org/about/index.
php (last visited Aug. 16, 2012).
281.
Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecomm. Capability to All Am.
in a Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant
to Section 706 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, As Amended by the Broadband Data Improvement Act, 26 FCC Rcd. 8008, 8012-13 (2011); see 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2012).
282.
See 2013 U-NII NPRM, supra note 5, at 1771; see also Press Release, Fed.
Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski Announces Major Effort To Increase
Wi-Fi Speeds and Alleviate Wi-Fi Congestion at Airports, Convention Centers, and in Homes
with Multiple Devices and Users (Jan. 9, 2013), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/
chairman-announces-effort-increase-wi-fi-speeds.
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licensed spectrum that they use to perform their constitutionally reserved
police powers, including public safety, fire protection, medical and ambulance services, traffic control, and sanitation.283 Thanks to smart spectrum
sharing technologies, municipalities can now make available for secondary
uses any unused portions of the spectrum bands reserved for local
governments.
For example, municipalities could directly encourage unlicensed mobile
wireless broadband access in public schools and for public employees, and
reclaim such spectrum when necessary. They could also make parts of their
licensed spectrum available to wireless broadband service providers who, in
turn, could use those municipal frequencies to off-load some of the data
traffic, reduce network congestion, and improve quality of service.284 Wired
broadband network service providers, too, could benefit from this municipally-administered provisioning.285 The FCC also could adopt a more aggressive outlook on municipal administration of infrastructure by initiating a
rulemaking to determine how municipalities can encourage secondary uses
at the local levels, including the development of private networks to support
unlicensed use and the provision of service in and along public and quasipublic spaces like parks, major thoroughfares, schools, convention centers,
and hospitals.
With all of these potential possibilities, local governments would have
an invaluable role to play in expanding broadband adoption and use. Assuming that different localities employ just one or some of these options, the
diversity of experiences across the country would provide an important opportunity for “intergovernmental learning” between municipalities about
how best to develop and make broadband access more available to local
residents across the country, and which uses are best suited to the different
bands of the spectrum.286
The developments in broadband infrastructure development and possibilities for opening spectrum currently licensed to local governments
strongly suggest that municipal governments should participate in federal
spectrum administration. Yet there is no provision or clear institutional
mechanism in the new orthodoxy that integrates municipal governments (or
any similar local entity) in decision-making. Local participation has been
the modus operandi for Congress and the FCC in the context of broadband
network infrastructure development in recent years generally. For that rea283.
See 47 C.F.R. § 90.20 (2013).
284.
2013 U-NII NPRM, supra note 5, at 1794.
285.
See, e.g., Ellis Smith, City Builds WiFi Network, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
(July 17, 2011), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011/jul/17/city-builds-wifi-network/?
business (describing effort in Chattanooga to use $30 million in federal and state grants to
install 220 wireless routers, or access points, throughout the city).
286.
Sylvain, supra note 6, at 821 (citing, inter alia, Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 321 (1998)).
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son, legislators and regulators should require the same in federal spectrum
administration.
CONCLUSION
We should be past the time of enthrallment with new smart spectrum
sharing technologies. As transformational as they may be for how we interact with each other, policymakers must now put them to work for communities. In order to do that, scholars and policymakers must incorporate extant
conventions in public lawmaking, including creating opportunities for systematic local public participation, without compromising the ability of engineers and entrepreneurs to continue to innovate.

